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IW hy does the popular culture respond to euthanasia? W e rarely find the question and 
never find the answer in bioethics. D ilem m a ethics or quandary ethics, at the heart o f  the 
field, fail to address the root causes o f  the moral anarchy o f  our times. Despite calls from  
bioethicists, such as Daniel Callahan, for a communitarian bioethics1 dealing with the 
moral life in its societal dimension, it is still lacking. This is disappointing considering 
the fact that cultural biases and attitudes almost single-handedly determine the shape and 
direction o f  society. The prevailing attitudes in a culture do not merely influence the 
debate; they determine the issues.
A  revolution in attitudes towards death and suffering has taken place in our present 
age. It is not technology itse lf that has given us the euthanasia debate, but the attitudes 
towards death and suffering which it helped to shape. Moral debate doesn’t occur in a 
cultural vacuum. The key issues are best understood within the context o f  the cultural 
background from which they emerged.
The euthanasia debate isn ’t about ‘pulling the plug’. It’s about our attitudes to the 
realities o f  death and suffering. It concerns our attitudes towards fellow  human beings in 
their suffering and dying. It reflects our attitudes towards human dignity when it is 
assaulted by disease and dying. It w ill take more than equations-like moral mathematics 
to balance the m odem  drive for euthanasia. It w ill necessitate a critical analysis o f  
contemporary attitudes towards death and suffering. Only then w ill w e be nourishing the 
debate at its roots, rather than trimming its ends.
G E N E R A L  IN T R O D U C T IO N
1 Daniel Callahan, ‘ Bioethics; Private Choice and Common Good’ in Hastings Center Report, 24 (1994), 
28.
2Chapter one examines the changing attitudes towards death from the M iddle A ges to  
the nineteenth century. The source for this remarkable panorama, is the seminal work o f  
the acclaimed social historian, Philippe Aries. His source material and investigative work 
is rich and varied. He dips into everything from churches, religious rituals, graveyards, 
w ills, literature, letters and art, to reconstruct history. This study benefits greatly from his 
extensive research and his insights. In the period spanning the Middle A ges to the 
nineteenth century, there were subtle yet significant changes in attitudes towards death. 
They occurred so gradually that social commentators o f  the time would have barely 
noticed. The longest held attitude to death was that o f  calm acceptance to death as the 
com m on fate o f  the species. The focus gradually shifted to death o f  the se lf  in the twelfth  
century and finally to death o f  the other in the eighteenth century.
Chapter two charts the revolution in attitudes towards death in contemporary society. 
This is supplemented by social theory which explains the denial o f  death in high- 
modemity. D ying is removed from the hom e to the hospital and is dissected into little 
bits. Those monumental reminders o f  death, the dying them selves, the sick and the aged, 
are systematically hidden from public view. Young people no longer grow up with death 
around them. They do not learn how  to cope with suffering or death because their role- 
m odels have been removed from wider society. This reinforces fear and denial o f  death 
in the individual mind. The attempt to ‘manage’ death socially by hiding it and only  
letting it exert its influence in controlled circumstances is taken a step further in 
euthanasia. Euthanasia is the fulfilment o f  this desire to  suppress death. However, 
suffering had to be stripped o f  meaning before euthanasia would be accepted.
3Chapter three illustrates that attitudes to suffering and death are inextricably bound. 
Suffering is m edicalised and in the process there is a trade-off between meaning in 
suffering and pain killing. Suffering is denied a metaphysical or cultural meaning. The 
human body is broken down into component parts to be fixed by medical specialists. 
This serves to ‘deconstruct mortality’. When the component parts are fixed without 
reference to the whole, it distracts from the fact that one’s whole being is mortal. It also 
gives rise to a dualism between the person and the body. This manifests itse lf in the 
euthanasia debate in relation to patients in the so-called persistent vegetative state. I am  
indebted to the staunch social critics o f  western m edical civilisation o f  Ivan Illich and 
Arthur W. Frank, for much o f  m y social analysis, in particular regarding the attack on a 
m echanistic philosophy o f  health care. Suffering was reduced to the reality o f  physical 
pain, which encouraged the treatment o f  patients as mere physical entities, rather than as 
human beings. Compassion in m edicine faded as the focus o f  medicine became treating 
pain, not patients. These factors paved the way for killing pain at the expense o f  the 
patient.
Chapter four looks at the concrete ways in which contemporary attitudes towards 
suffering influence the euthanasia debate. For exam ple, the denial o f  meaning in 
suffering leads to inappropriate quality o f  life judgements resulting in euthanasia o f  new­
borns. The refusal to suffer the loss o f  freedom involved in illness and incumbent 
dependency, lead som e to deny the humanity o f  non-autonomous human beings and to 
argue for their being euthanised. It demonstrates that the main argument for euthanasia, 
namely autonomy, doesn’t hold up and that what really is at issue is a denial o f  any value 
in suffering. A  sick person’s request for euthanasia may be accepted whereas a healthy
4person’s request would be rejected out o f  hand. The value o f  the former is denied and o f  
the latter affirmed. Moral theologians, ethicists and philosophers such as M cCormick, 
Gormally and Finnis feature prominently in this chapter.
Chapter five presents an alternative approach to human suffering and indirectly death, 
o f  which suffering provides a glimpse. Suffering is discussed in the light o f  the Christian 
tradition. The latter has a rich history o f  a ministry o f  com passion to the sick. This 
chapter advocates that m edicine return to its Christian roots in order to becom e once 
again a ministry o f  mercy. The Christian concept o f  mercy is outlined, based on the 
Encyclical Letter o f  Pope John Paul II on the M ercy o f  God, Dives in Misericordia. It 
sets out a different understanding o f  mercy than is exercised in ‘mercy-killing. ’ In the 
Christian tradition mercy ‘restores to value’ the recipient, it does not destroy him. It is 
often said that we can suffer any ‘what’ i f  w e know ‘w hy’. The meaning o f  suffering in 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition is set out. Priority is given to the Christian meaning o f  
human suffering revealed by Christ. This necessitates a treatment o f  the central m essage 
o f  the Apostolic Letter o f  John Paul II on human suffering, Salvifici Doloris. This 
powerfully demonstrates the meaning o f  human suffering and the value and dignity o f  
those who suffer. By uniting their suffering to Christ they are a force for good in the 
world and contribute to humankind’s salvation.
This thesis is not designed primarily to provide answers, but to raise questions about 
contemporary unexamined attitudes to death and suffering in m odem  society, and to 
challenge cultural biases. This is the only way those in the movement for life can 
overthrow a system o f  meaning which promotes death. I believe that deep debate on 
what we value as a society is necessary, not sim ply narrowly focused examinations o f
5hard cases. It is not within the scope o f  this thesis to put forward concrete proposals for 
cultivating a culture o f  life. However, I believe that restoring meaning to  human 
suffering and value to the dying is a good place to start.
6Chapter 1: Changing Attitudes Towards Death
7This chapter examines the changing attitudes towards death that dominated western  
society from the M iddle A ges up until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Philippe Aries coined the terms ‘familiar death’, ‘death o f  the s e l f ,  and ‘death o f  the 
other’, to describe the subtle shift in focus that slow ly emerged in attitudes towards death 
during this vast tim e-scale.1 They brilliantly capture the essential characteristics o f  the 
prevailing attitudes towards death during each period.
1.1 TAMED DEATH
This ‘the first, the oldest, the longest held, and the m ost com m on’ attitude toward death, 
is best summed up in the phrase ‘and w e shall d ie’2. In this period, life expectancy was 
short and so death was very familiar. It was accepted calmly as a com m on destiny o f  the 
species. This attitude, which spanned several m illennia, dominated up until the Late 
M iddle Ages. It is evident in the literature o f  the period, for example in the oldest 
romances.3 In their description o f  the deaths o f  the knights o f  old, com m on  
characteristics emerge. The knights, for exam ple, Roland, Tristram and Gawain had 
forewarning o f  death. Even king Ban, w ho was rendered unconscious by a bad fall, came 
round in time to discover blood dripping from his face4. H e knew  he was dying and 
prayed to  God.
1 Cf. Philippe Aries, Western Attitudes Toward Death From The Middle Ages To The Present (London: 
Marion Boyars Publishers, 1976).
2Ibid., 55.
3Cf. Ibid. (Re: chansons de geste).
4Cf. ibid.,3.
8This reflects the attitude o f  this period that a sudden death was a curse because it 
deprived one o f  the opportunity to put their spiritual and earthly affairs in order.5 This is 
in stark contrast to the popular wish today for a quick and painless death.
The attitude towards death in this period was marked by realism. This is reflected in 
the literature o f  the day. Even D on Quixote, who lived in a land o f  make-belief, did not 
attempt to day-dream his death away. It was the one and only thing that brought him  
back to reality. He calm ly announced to his niece ‘I feel that death is near’6. Saint 
Martin de Tours and the musician Bach both knew when they were approaching death 
and were resigned to their fate. Their realisation o f  their imminent departure from this 
world came, as with the knights, through natural signs or inner conviction. There was no 
suggestion o f  magic at work or o f  a supernatural premonition. 7Jean Guitton, writing in 
1941, also testifies to this sim ple attitude towards death when he reflects on the matter- 
of-fact attitude o f  the mother o f  M onsieur Pouget when she was dying o f  cholera in 1874. 
When death was imminent she called for the priest to administer the last rites. Guittion 
comments:
We can see how the Pougets in these bygone days passed on from this 
world into the next, as simple and practical persons, observers o f  
signs and above all o f  themselves. They were in no hurry to die, but 
when they saw that the hour had com e, then without haste or delay, 
but with a sense o f  proper timing they died as Christians.8
5 H. Wass, F. M. Berardo, R. A. Neimeyer, Dying. Facing the Facts, (New York: Hemisphere publishing 
corporation, 21988), 16.
6 Aries, Western Attitudes TowardDeatth, 4.
7 Cf. ibid.
8 Ibid., 7.
91.1.1 Death :A Household Event.
Death was a household event. The dying person presided over a ritual in which he had 
been an observer countless tim es before. The priests, parents, friends, neighbours and 
children crowded around the sick bed for this customary Christian ceremony. A t the 
beginning o f  the eighteenth century, doctors, who knew more about principles o f  
hygiene, began to complain about overcrowding.9 Y et as late as the early nineteenth 
century ‘passers-by who m et the priest bearing the last sacrament still formed a little 
procession and accompanied him into the sickroom .’ Death was desensitised by today’s 
standards. Unlike now, children were not sheltered from death. ‘Until the eighteenth 
century, no portrayal o f  a deathbed scene ever failed to include children’ .10
The ritual o f  death was simple. The dying person follow ed a set protocol. First, he or 
she expressed sadness at their impending loss o f  life. This was a ritual moment and 
evoked no great show o f  emotion. Then, the dying person said their goodbyes. Finally, 
the priest granted absolution and the dying person comm ended their soul to God.n
Death was public, literally, as already outlined, due to  the numbers present at the 
deathbed, but also in the sense that the people recognised that death o f  the individual 
diminished the entire community. Afterwards, they strived to reintegrate. This sense o f  
community is almost com pletely alien to the modern mindset. These people saw  
them selves as Christians first, as members o f  the local community second and as 
individuals last.12 This manifested itse lf in a calm acceptance o f  death as a comm on fate.
9 Cf ibid., 11, 12.
10 Ibid, 12.
11 Cf. ibid., 13.
12 Cf. Wass and Berardo, R. A. Neimeyer, Dying, 16.
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The familiarity with death had what John o f  Chrysostom considered an unsavoury
elem ent i.e. the coexistence o f  the living and the dead13. The Ancients honoured their
dead but kept the worlds o f  the living and the dead separate. In the M iddle A ges, despite
interdicts o f  Canon law, tombs were built inside city walls. This practice grew up around
the cult o f  the martyrs. The people believed that i f  they were buried near the tombs o f  the
martyrs, they would be protected from hell. The exact resting-place o f  the bones did not
matter, so long as it was close to the martyrs, the saints or the church, which contained
the H oly sacrament14. Church and cemetery amalgamated in the M iddle Ages. Dead
bodies were entrusted to the church. The cemetery was a public place. Traditionally, it
was linked to the notion o f  asylum, but people began to m eet there to carry out business,
shop or even dance. In 1231, the church Council o f  Rouen was forced to forbid dancing
in cemeteries or churches -  under pain o f  excom m unication15. This promiscuity between
the living and the dead is in complete opposition to the hiddenness o f  death in m odem
society. In the seventeenth century, signs o f  intolerance began to appear, yet for more
than a thousand years:
The spectacle o f  the dead, whose bones were always being brought up 
to the surface o f  the cemeteries, as was the skull in Hamlet, made no 
more impression upon the living than did the idea o f  their ow n death.
They were as familiar with the dead as they were familiarised with the 
idea o f  their own death16
1.1.2 G rav e  D ancers





In the twelfth century, the traditional attitude towards death was m odified due to a new  
emphasis on the self. The focus shifted from the notion o f  collective destiny, to one’s 
own death. This was reflected in a change in eschatology. Christ came to be seen as 
Judge rather than Saviour. M oreover, the moment o f  judgem ent was brought forward 
from the end o f  time to the precise moment o f  the individual’s death. The phenomenon 
o f  interest in macabre themes emerged in this period and there was a revival o f  tom bs.17
1.2.1 Eschatology.
The tomb o f  bishop Agilbert, who died and was buried around 680, is typical o f  the 
eschatology o f  early Christendom. It bears the apocalyptic im age o f  Christ, returning at 
the end o f  the world in majesty, surrounded by the four evangelists. Another image 
portrays the resurrection o f  the dead with arms upraised, acclaim ing the returning Christ. 
There is no suggestion o f  judgem ent in evidence. The dead who had died in Christ would  
rest in peace until his second com ing when they would be given paradise.18
However, in twelfth century there was a shift in ideas. The eschatological imagery 
changed.19 The apocalyptic vision o f  Christ was accompanied by a new  image inspired by 
the book o f  Matthew, that o f  the last judgement. Christ was depicted separating the just 
from the damned. In the thirteenth century, this portrayal o f  Christ as Judge almost 
com pletely supplanted the image o f  Christ as Saviour.20
17 Cf. ibid., 28, 29.
18 Cf. ibid., 29.
19 A riès is refering to a different em phasis on the Last Judgement rather than a totally new  iconography.
See also Arthur K ingsley  Porter, T h e  C r o s s e s  a n d  C u l tu r e  o f  I r e l a n d ,  (N ew  Haven: Y ale U niversity Press, 
1931), 73.
20 Cf. Ariès, W e s te r n  A t t i t u d e s  T o w a r d  D e a t h ,  2 9 ,  31.
1.2 D E A T H  O F  TH E SE L F
12
Each person’s life was conceived o f  in terms o f  a balance sheet wherein his or her 
good and bad deeds would be recorded. Originally, in keeping with the attitude towards 
death as the as the common law  o f  the species, as previously discussed, this was seen as a 
cosm ic account book. However, with the rise o f  individualism, it degenerated into an 
individual balance or tally, which was closed at the end o f  each person’s life. The risen 
were depicted wearing these account books around their necks, as som e sort o f  passport 
that gained them entry into heaven when presented at its gates on the last day. Hence, the 
individual biography was not closed at the time o f  death. It was extended at least until 
the end o f  time, when the just win eternity and the damned are snuffed out."'
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed the moment o f  judgement brought 
forward to the moment o f  death. In other words, the account book was balanced 
immediately at the time o f  death, rather than in space, at the Second Coming. This 
m odification in thinking is evident in the books or treatises, which set out the proper 
manner o f  dying.22 They bear witness to the tainting o f  the sim ple ceremony, 
characteristic o f  the traditional attitudes to death. The calm scene o f  the dying man in his 
sick bed, surrounded by fam ily and friends, engaged in a sim ple ritual, is interrupted by 
something visible only to the dying man. Supernatural beings have invaded the 
bedchamber and are vying for the dying man’s soul. ‘On one side are the Trinity, the 
Virgin, and the celestial court, on the other Satan and a monstrous army o f  dem ons.’23
21 Cf. ibid., 32.
22 Cf. ibid., 36 (artes moriendi).
23 Ibid., 34.
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The account book is still present, but God is no longer judge, only arbiter. The scene 
may be interpreted as a battle between the forces o f  good and evil or a trial on which the 
fate o f  the dying person rests. The dying person w ill see their whole life, as contained in 
the book, before his eyes. He w ill endure a final temptation, either to despair o f  his sins 
or give in to vainglory over his good deeds, or passion for things or persons. H is attitude 
at the moment o f  death can cancel out the book charting the deeds o f  his life24.
Spiritual writers found them selves trying to displace the popular notion that a virtuous 
life wasn’t that important because a good death redeemed everything. However, the 
b elie f that the attitude one took towards one’s own death, behaviour in dying, and 
circumstances surrounding death, had a moral importance, endured up until the twentieth
• • * 25century when it was rejected by industrialised societies.
1.2.2 M acabre Them es.
The phenomenon o f  macabre themes begins in the thirteenth century, but is more 
comm on in the fifteenth century. It involves the appearance o f  the rotting corpse or 
cadaver in funeral iconography and literature. These macabre themes are seen by many 
today, including Aries, as an exposition o f  the love for life, in the portrayal o f  the horror 
o f  death26. It m ay also be interpreted as the overthrow o f  the Christian world-view. 
However, the presence o f  such themes was limited to Eastern France and Western 
Germany and was never really accepted in Italy or Spain.
24 Cf. ibid., 36.
25 Cf. ibid., 38.
26 C f  ibid., 40.
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In this period last w ills convey the understanding o f  death as a peaceful passing.
The horror o f  physical death, o f  which the cadaver could be 
considered a sign was com pletely absent, which leads us to assume 
that it was also absent from the common mentality.27
However, macabre themes were present in sixteenth century poetry and they included not 
only physical decomposition but also illness and old age. These poets are not sim ply 
referring to biological demise, but are aware o f  the universal presence o f  corruption in 
nature. The corruption com es from within, not simply from outward forces working on 
the body.29 This corruption, evident in rotting corpses, is a sign o f  humanity’s failure. 
The sense o f  failure in the Late M iddle Ages is the com plete antithesis o f  the 
contemporary notion o f  failure. Today, failure is seen as personal failure, namely the 
failure to realise the potential w e had in our youth. It is tied up with not having achieved  
ones dreams. In the Late M iddle Ages, people lived constantly in the shadow o f  death. 
They knew their pleasures, people, places and possessions, were only on loan to them for 
a while and that they them selves were only passing through this world. Their sense o f  
failure was more an awareness o f  the transience o f  life. For this reason, they had a love  
o f  life, which has been shattered by today’s increased longevity.30
27 Ibid., 41.
28 “Je n’ay plus que les os, un sequelette je sem ble/décham é, dém uselé, d ép ou lp é.. .’’(Ibid., 42 .)
29 “Chascun conduit [du corps] /Puante matière produit/Hors du corps continuellem ent.”(Ibid).
30 Cf. ibid., 44 -45 .
15
The individualisation o f  tombs is the final and perhaps m ost obvious phenomenon in the 
manifestation o f  the focus on death o f  the self.
In Ancient Rom e, everyone, even the slaves, had their ow n burial place marked by an 
inscription.31 Countless funeral inscriptions dating from that period survive today. The 
tradition o f  burial sites, bearing the identity o f  the deceased at their actual resting-place, 
persisted into the beginning o f  the Christian era. Som e sepulchres even included a 
portrait o f  the deceased. However, by the fifth century, both inscription and portrait had 
disappeared, and burial sites became com pletely anonymous32. In the thirteenth century, 
when the focus shifted to death o f  the self, funeral inscriptions began to reappear after an 
absence o f  almost a century. They were rare at first, marking only the tombs o f  saints or 
queens e.g. Queen Mathilda, the first queen o f  Norman England33. Som e tombs bore not 
only inscriptions but also portraits. At first, the portraits depicted the deceased in their 
glorified humanity, risen from the dead. Later, it became realistic and reproduced the 
face o f  the person whilst alive. It went on to portray the death mask. B y the early 
seventeenth century, the tomb might brandish tw o portraits o f  the individual, one 
representing them whilst alive, the other in death34. The emphasis on on e’s own death 
was complete with the personalisation o f  tombs.
The most comm on form o f  funeral monuments, from the thirteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries, were plaques. They were the most affordable way o f  commemorating the 
dead.
31 Cf. ibid., 46.
32 Cf.p. 9.
33 Cf. Aries, W e s te r n  A t t i t u d e s  T o w a r d  D e a t h , 47.
34 Cf. ibid., 48.
1.2.3 Tom b Revival.
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Approximately thirty to forty centimetres w ide, they bore a sim ple ‘Here lies ... 
inscription’.35 They were fixed to church walls and ‘reveal the desire to render the burial 
place individual and to perpetuate the memory o f  the deceased in that spot’36. However, 
in the nineteenth century, the attitude toward death changes from focus on one’s own 
death to death o f  the other.
1.3 D E A T H  O F T H E  O T H E R
Beginning in the eighteenth century, death came to  be seen not as the comm on destiny o f  
the species, (tame death) nor as the concluding act in an individual’s biography, (one’s 
own death) but as a violent yet beautiful sundering o f  intimate relationships (death o f  the 
other).
1.3.1 R om antic D eath.
In the fifteenth century, death began to take on erotic undertones. The iconography o f  the 
sixteenth century depicted death raping the living. Death, like the sexual act, was seen as 
something, which tore people from everyday reality plunging them into an irrational, 
violent and beautiful world. Thanatos and Eros became related in art and literature. The 
ultimate love scene in Rom eo and Juliet was the death scene. The idea o f  romantic death 




37 C f  Aries, W e s te r n  A t t i t u d e s  T o w a r d  D e a t h ,  57, 58.
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Public deathbed scenes still took place, but with a difference. In the past, they were
solem n events, dictated by custom and rather banal. The dying person presided over the
ritual and those present were passive. However, by the nineteenth century, the attitude o f
those present had changed. They were stirred by a passionate sense o f  loss, which they
openly expressed. The ritual was still fulfilled, but was rendered unique by spontaneous
outbursts o f  emotion from fam ily and friends. Separation from loved ones was no longer
as easily tolerated.38 In this period, people were not sim ply m oved by  death scenes, but
by the very idea o f  death itself. This is the period o f  romantic death, as already outlined.
One contemporary, a young French girl, wrote:
D ying is a reward, since it is Heaven ... The favourite idea o f  my 
entire life is death, w hich has always made m e sm ile ... Nothing has 
ever been able to make the word death lugubrious for m e.39
1.3.2 C hildren Fam iliar w ith D eath.
It was no different in Victorian England. Gorer tells o f  the familiarity o f  death due to 
high rates o f  infant mortality. Children were encouraged to think about the death o f  
others and their own death. Practically everyone had w itnessed the death o f  at least one 
person40. Adults prepared children for facing death by encouraging them to learn from
38 Cf. ibid., 58.
39 Ibid., 60.
40 G eoffrey Gorer, ‘The Pornography o f  D eath ’ in E n c o u n t e r ,  5 (1995 ),5 I .
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the dying. The fact that deaths took place in the hom e meant that:
children learned how  to cope with the death o f  the other and by 
implication their own, in essentially the same way that they acquired the 
more mundane domestic skills; that is by observing and taking part in the 
household’s daily activities.41
The children’s literature o f  the period also prepared children for death. Its fictional 
accounts o f  young people dying, desensitised children to death and dying and instructed 
them how  to cope with death in real life. This isn’t to say that children didn’t experience 
fear or bereavement in relation to the death o f  others or anxiety at the prospect o f  then- 
own death. However, they weren’t entirely without resources to deal with it should it 
arrive, and in some sense it was expected.42
1.3.3 M ourning
Mourning in this period was a matter o f  social convention. M ourning imposed  
limitations on the mourners’ social activity, but also required that they receive visits from  
relatives and friends. This was not entirely negative because it gave the fam ily time to  
grieve, but also ensured they accept visits, thus protecting them from the excesses o f  
grief. However, it also may have forced a family to demonstrate sorrow for a certain 
period o f  time, perhaps even when they had ceased to be sorrowful.43
41 M ichael M ulkay, ‘Social D eath in B ritain’ in D avid  Clark (ed), T h e  S o c i o l o g y  o f  D e a t h  (Oxford: 
B lackw ell Publishers, 1993), 43.
42 Cf. ibid., 42.
43 Cf. Ariès, W e s t e r n  A t t i t u d e s  T o w a r d  D e a t h ,  66.
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In the nineteenth century, the social conventions regarding mourning were not 
observed. People engaged in exaggerated, ostentatious and spontaneous mourning, 
which could include crying and fainting in public. After seven centuries o f  sobriety, the 
people had returned to the excessive mourning o f  the Early M iddle Ages. The nineteenth 
century was a period o f  hysterical mourning. A  scene in Mark Tw ain’s “The 
Californian’s Tale,” from 1893, beautifully illustrates this. A  man w ho had never com e 
to terms with his w ife ’s death, awaits her return on the date o f  their anniversary nineteen 
years later. Family and friends are present at the ‘party’ and help him maintain the 
illusion44. Fear o f  death in the nineteenth century was fear o f  death o f  the other.
1.3.4 A  C ult o f  M em ory.
The cult o f  tombs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has, at its heart, concern for 
the death o f  the other. It is very different to the period o f  antiquity when the dead were 
entrusted to the care o f  the church or even the seventeenth century desire for funeral 
inscriptions. The accumulation o f  the dead within church grounds becam e intolerable in 
the eighteenth century. This represented a complete break with what was common 
practice for alm ost a millennium45. It was due to a twofold concern for public health and 
the dignity o f  the dead, whose bones continued to be exhibited in the charnel houses46.
44 Cf. ibid., 66.
45 Cf. ibid., 69.
46 Cf. ibid., 70.
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They recalled the ancient piety for the dead, evident in their tombs at Pompeii. The 
survivors’ unwillingness to accept the departure o f  their loved ones m anifested itse lf in 
an unwillingness to hand their bodies over to the church. They wanted them ‘at hom e’ 
and so buried them on family properties or e lse  nearby in a public cemetery where they 
could visit them often. M oreover, they wanted the burial site to belong totally to  the 
deceased and his family, where they could cultivate his memory. They didn’t want to 
share the spot with the church. They visited their dead at their burial site as they would  
visit them in their home. This was a cult o f  memory.47
Cemeteries were reinstated as a central place in the city, as they had been in antiquity. 
They grew in size due to the new piety and respect for tombs. It was no longer 
acceptable to pile corpse upon corpse, as they had done in the charnel houses o f  the 
M iddle Ages. The public authorities wanted, during the reign o f  N apoleon III, to 
deconsecrate the Parisian cemeteries, which had been originally constructed outside the 
city, but had been enclosed by urban expansion. Unanimous public opinion prevented 
such plans48. Today, the cult o f  the dead is also tied up with patriotism. The anniversary 
o f  world wars is about remembering the dead soldier and is centred around a visit to a 
monument which perpetuates his m em ory.49
47 Cf. ibid., 72.
48 Cf. ibid., 75.
49 Cf. ibid., 76.
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The mental attitudes towards death, and tombs and monuments to the dead, were one 
throughout Western civilisation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But 
whereas the United States, England and a part o f  North Western Europe, remained 
faithful to the old model o f  cemeteries, which were sim ple in design, Continental Europe 
-  France, Germany and Italy -  constructed extravagant monuments for its dead, in the 
baroque style. This may in part be put down to religious differences. However, the 
division o f  church into Catholic and Protestant came long before the divorce in funeral 
attitudes30. Perhaps the biggest influence may be the rate o f  industrialisation and 
urbanisation. ‘Neo-Baroque funeral attitudes developed in cultures in which, even in 
towns and large cities, econom ic growth was less rapid and rural influences persisted.’31. 
Whatever the reason, a fault line appeared and continued to widen throughout the 
twentieth century. The great twentieth century refusal to accept death came about, and 
progressed, on only one side o f  that frontier.32
Death denying, as will be examined in the next chapter, coincided with the removal o f  
death or dying, from the hom e to the hospital. Death was m edicalised and in the process 
was stripped o f  meaning. It was not technology itse lf that posed the problem, rather the 
way it impacted on our self-conception as human beings and our attitudes to great human 
mysteries like suffering and death. The technological mentality was instrumental in 
bringing about the great twentieth century refusal to accept death.
50 Cf. ibid., 80.
51 Ibid., 81.
52 Cf. ibid., 82.
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Chapter 2: Death Denying
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The changes in attitudes towards death from the Early M iddle A ges to the mid-nineteenth 
century occurred so slow ly, and over such a long period o f  time, that they were barely 
noticeable by contemporaries. However, there has been such a brutal revolution in 
attitudes towards death in our present day age that social observers couldn't fail to 
comment. The subject o f  death became a taboo. This phenom enon began in the U. S. and 
spread to industrialised Europe. The truth o f  death began to be challenged in the name o f  
compassion. There was a desire to spare the sick from the seriousness o f  their illness. 
However, this sentiment was supplanted by a m odem  sentiment, namely the desire to 
preserve not the dying, but those around them and society in general, from the 
disturbance and ugliness o f  death. One must pretend death doesn’t exist ‘for it is 
henceforth given that life is always happy or should always seem to be so .’1 Death had to 
be stripped o f  its meaning in order to preserve society’s raison d’être o f  collective  
happiness, which had been reduced to maximum pleasure.2 The m édicalisation o f  death 
facilitated the process o f  ‘hushing up5.3 The removal o f  dying form the hom e to the 
hospital between 1930 and 1950 was an important physical phenomenon. Originally, the 
sick went to the hospital to be healed, or to struggle against death. Eventually the person 
went to the hospital for the specific purpose o f  dying -  it had becom e inconvenient to die 
at hom e4. Death became a matter o f  technical expertise.
2.1 FO R B ID D EN  D E A T H
1 Ariès, W e s t e r n  A t t i t u d e s  T o w a r d  D e a t h ,  89.




It was no longer a ritual presided over by the dying person or even the family but by 
medical professionals. Death became bound up with the cessation o f  care. The medical 
narrative became the only acceptable narrative o f  sickness and death.
Death has been dissected, cut to bits by a series o f  little steps, which  
finally makes it impossible to know which step was the real death, the 
one in which consciousness was lost, or the one in which breathing 
stopped. All o f  these little silent deaths have replaced or erased the 
great dramatic act o f  death, and no one any longer has the strength or 
patience to wait over a period o f  weeks for a moment which has lost a 
part o f  its m eaning/
Doctors determine the circumstances o f  death. M eanwhile, ‘they try to obtain from their 
patients ‘an acceptable style o f  living while dying.’6 Acceptability is judged in terms o f  
what is tolerable for onlookers. The ‘embarrassing graceless dying’ must be avoided at 
all costs. It may evoke uncontrollable em otion in survivors and public displays o f  any 
emotion other than happiness are strictly forbidden. One has a social obligation to 
contribute to the collective happiness by appearing always to be happy and choking back 
tears. Crying is only permitted in private. It is considered bad manners to be morbid.
Gorer compares the contemporary interdict on death to the taboo on sex  in Victorian 
England. M odem  society has traded-off the taboo on sex for a taboo on death. Death is 
now  shameful and unmentionable whereas sex  is openly discussed. Death has becom e  
the new  ‘not in front o f  the children’ subject. Few  children today are told that they were 




7Gorer, ‘The Pornography o f  D eath’, 51.
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Everything relating to death and dying in m odem  society must be discrete. Outward 
manifestations o f  suffering are suppressed. The practice o f  wearing dark clothes to  
signify mourning has been discarded. ‘The ugly facts are relentlessly hidden; the art o f  
the embalmer, is an art o f  complete denial.’8 Embalming is very popular in the United 
States. Americans don’t like death to disappear, because it is a profit-making industry, so 
instead they transform it, put make-up on it. This hides the nature o f  death because the 
deceased ‘thanks to embalming is still present, as i f  he were awaiting you to greet you or 
take you o ff  on a walk. ’9
Embalming isn’t as dominant in Europe because the practice o f  view ing corpses has 
declined. In Ireland, w e still v iew  corpses, but the wake has almost been abandoned. 
Funeral homes with their perfumed air are purpose built for visitation o f  corpses. Crowds 
are directed in one door and out another door with conveyer belt efficiency.
In 1885, the image and name o f  ‘undertakers’ changed. They becam e known as 
funeral directors and m odem  culture embraced them as ‘doctors o f  g r ie f. Their job  was 
not simply m echanical, but to help mourning survivors to return to normality in the 
shortest possible tim e.10
Cremation is the most popular method o f  disposal o f  remains in England. This 
probably has less to do with conservation o f  land and more to do with cremation being 
‘the m ost radical means o f  getting rid o f  the body and o f  forgetting it, o f  nullifying it’11. 
W hile the practice o f  visiting graves has not been altogether abandoned, um s are rarely 
visited.
8 Ibid., 51.
9 A ries, W e s te r n  A t t i t u d e s  T o w a r d  D e a t h s  100, 102.
10 Cf. ibid., 99.
11 Ibid., 91.
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2.2 SO C IA L T H E O R Y  O N C O N T E M PO R A R Y  A T T IT U D E S T O  D E A T H
Anthony Giddens believes that contemporary attitudes to death are inextricably linked to 
the project o f  ‘late’ or ‘high’ modernity -  our present day world.12 The sequestration o f  
death, the enforced absence from public space o f  considerations o f  mortality, can only be 
understood within the context o f  central features o f  what is popularly called post 
modernity. Giddens favours the term ‘high’ modernity because, like Bauman, he 
believes that post modernity is not the end o f  modernity, as the prefix suggests, but rather 
the fulfilment or victory o f  m odem  culture. ‘High modernity is a period in which the 
consequences o f  modernity are becom ing more radicalised and universalised than 
before’13. The overriding characteristic o f  modernity is a desire for control14. Order is 
understood as manmade. Nature was the enemy as was anything spontaneous, 
unpredictable or contingent.
Modernity was concerned with subordinating nature to  human purposes. It was 
characterised by instrumental reason, which has been defined as ‘the application o f  
humanly organised principles o f  science and technology to the mastery o f  the natural 
world’.15 The transformations involved were unprecedented in history. The natural 
world, not least o f  all human nature, became raw material to be moulded according to  
human design. The natural world was de-spiritualised. ‘Once a matter o f  providence and 
revelation, life had turned into the object o f  techne,’16 The impulse for order and control
12 Philip M ellor ‘D eath in high modernity: the contemporary presence and absence o f  death’ in D avid  Clark  
(ed.), T h e  S o c i o l o g y  o f  D e a t h  (Oxford: B lackw ell Publishers, 1993) 12.
13 Anthony Giddens, C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  M o d e r n i t y  (Cambridge: Polity  press, 1990), 3.
14 Idem, M o d e r n i t y  a n d  S e l f - I d e n t i t y : S e l f  a n d  S o c i e t y  i n  th e  L a t e  M o d e r n  A g e  (Cambridge: P olity  press, 
1991), 12.
15 Ibid., 145.
16 Zymunt Bauman, I n t i m a t i o n s  o f  P o s t m o d e m i t y  (London: R outledge, 1 9 9 2 ) ,  3 5 .
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was reflected in a search for utopias -  the perfect world in which nothing was 
unaccounted for or left to chance. Urban planning reflected this drive for perfection. ‘In 
the city o f  reason there were to be no winding roads, no cul de sacs and no unattended 
sites left to chance -  and thus no vagabonds, vagrants or nom ads.’17 The incessant drive 
for the perfect order would not be complete until “every blade o f  grass was tidied into a 
park with concrete paths and iron railings”18. Happiness was to be found in a carefully 
controlled world.
Modernity is a post-traditional order. A ll beliefs and practices are open to w holesale  
revision and technological intervention, even human life  itself. Modernity is generally 
identified with industrialised societies, which have been cut loose from their moorings in 
tradition. Modernity dismantled the meta-narratives o f  tradition because they have a 
binding normative character and moral content which run counter to modernity’s 
m obilising dynamics o f  control. Universal moral principles make tradition an inertial 
force, which may lead society to block the technical power to introduce something new. 
But whereas modernity sought to replace the traditional truths it dismantled with new  
certainties, albeit unsuccessfully19, post-modernity ‘did not seek to substitute one truth 
for another, one life ideal for another’20. Post modernity ‘denies in advance the right o f  
all or any revelation to take the place vacated by the deconstructed or discredited rules’21. 
Post modernity banishes truths, standards, ideals and ultimately meaning from its world.
17 Ibid., XV.
18 Oliver O Donovan, B e g o t t e n  o r  M a d e  (N ew  York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1984), 5.
19 Cf. Giddens, C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  M o d e r n i t y ,  29, 176.
20 Bauman, I n t i m a t i o n s  o f  P o s t m o d e r n i t y ,  ix.
21 Ibid., ix.
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2.2.1 The Sequestration of death from public life.
Berger argues that all human societies create structures, which give people a sense, o f  
what is meaningful and real.22 In other words, society contributes to our sense o f  identity 
and purpose. The power o f  society, therefore, does not merely rest on social structures or 
what Berger calls ‘machineries o f  control,’ but on society’s ‘ability to  constitute and 
impose itself as reality.’23. Our ‘world’ is a social construct. According to Foucault, 
death ‘strips away sociality to reveal the heart o f  an otherwise invisible truth’24. This 
truth for Foucault is pure individuality. Death raises existential questions for the 
individual which threaten what Giddens calls ‘ontological security’. ‘Ontological 
security’ refers to the sense o f  order and meaning persons find in their day to day lives25. 
Berger proposes, as already outlined, that this sense o f  order and security is largely 
defined by society. Ontological security can be threatened by any form o f  disorder which  
may throw into question the meaningfulness and reality o f  social life. Death is a potent 
threat to ontological security and the social order, because it undermines even the most 
basic assumptions upon which social life is constructed. It shatters ontological security 
because it ‘signals the threatened irreality o f  the self-projects which modernity 
encourages people to embark upon.’26 This can result in a paralysis o f  the will and hence 
prevent people from participating in society’s conventions or even cause the rejection o f  
the legitim acy o f  social frameworks.
22 Cf. M ellor ‘D eath in high m odernity’, 14. See also P. Berger, T h e  S a c r e d  C a n o p y :  E l e m e n t s  o f  A  
S o c i o l o g i c a l  T h e o r y ’ o f  R e l i g i o n  (N ew  York: D oubleday, 1967).
23 M ellor ‘D eath in h igh m odernity’, 14.
24 D avid Clark, T h e  S o c i o l o g y  o f  D e a t h ,  (Oxford: B lackw ell Publishers, 1993),3 .
25M ellor ‘D eath in high m odernity’, 12.
26 Cf. ibid., 19.
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For this reason society ‘brackets out’ questions such as death which, were the 
individual to seriously contemplate them, would pose a potent threat to ontological 
security and hence the social order itself. Death challenges both modernity and it’s 
bracketing process. It defies social containment or control. It is the point at which  
‘reflexivity,’ (defined as ‘the systematic and critical examination, monitoring and 
revision o f  all beliefs and practices in the light o f  changing circumstances)27 central to 
high modernity, is rendered useless. A  dead person can no longer plan or revise. 
Giddens notes that ‘death remains the great extrinsic fact o f  human existence ...death  
becom es a point zero, it is nothing more than the point at which human control over 
human existence finds an outer lim it.’28 It is difficult to bracket out because it is an 
inevitable fact o f  human existence. Its presence and absence in m odem  society is 
paradoxical. In short, death is sequestrated from high modernity in order to retain the 
individual’s commitment to the social order.
Death cannot be answered within the framework o f  high modernity so  it is 
conspicuously denied an answer. The enforced absence o f  death from the public realm  
means that individuals are left to make sense o f  death alone. Individuals, forced to deal 
with death in private, find it an even more terrifying subject. ‘Because meaning has been  
so privatised, any attempts to construct meaning around death are now  inherently 
fragile. ’29 In a secular world, devoid o f  com m unally constructed values or tradition, the
27 Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity, as reported by Mellor, ‘Death in high modernity’, 17.
28Giddens, Modernity and Self-Jdentity, 1 62.
29 Mellor ‘Death in high modernity’, 21.
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individual is at best left to choose their approach to death from a multiplicity on offer in 
the culturally diverse m odem  society. The emphasis on personal preference underscores 
the point that i f  everybody is right then nobody is right.
Therefore, death is doubly frightening for the m odem  individual. First, because it 
opens the individual up to the terror o f  the m eaningless o f  their everyday lives and 
second, because they are unable to construct meaning around death in high modernity. In 
such a context the temptation to run for cover is too hard to resist. Death denying is 
infectious. Society has encouraged the individual to becom e an active participant in the 
process.
2.2.2 The decline in the capacity to act.
Children in present day society, unlike the elderly or children o f  past generations are not 
expected to die. Society expects childhood to be death free. Excluding neo-natal deaths, 
accidents are the m ost common cause o f  deaths amongst children30. In cases o f  
accidental death, the future parents anticipated for their child is wiped out without 
warning and, more often than not, without consolation. The individual finds it difficult to 
construct meaning around death in post-modemity. Due to decline in b e lie f in life after 
death, many parents do not have the hope o f  reunion with their child in the next life. 
Professionals may provide counselling, but relatives and friends pointedly avoid talking 
about the death because they are uncomfortable with the subject. They manifest all the 
symptoms o f  society’s flight from death. They begin to avoid the bereaved or reduce 
contact with them because they don’t know what to do or say. Handlungsverlust, the
30Mulkay, ‘Social Death in Britain’, 43. Cf. S. Foster and O.Smith, Brief Lives, (London: Arlington Books, 
1987).
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decline o f  the capacity to act, is a term coined by Gehlen to describe the plight o f  
individuals faced with death follow ing the deconstruction o f  tradition31. The bereaved 
are socially isolated, just as the dying and the elderly, because they are living reminders 
o f  the unavoidable reality o f  death. The obligation to suffer alone exacerbates the sense 
o f  loss experienced by the bereaved.
In the case o f  death from cancer, family and friends are given an opportunity to 
readjust their relationships with the dying person. They take a shared response.32 
Unfortunately, that response often takes the form o f  a denial o f  death. A  pretence o f  
recovery or normality is maintained until the biological dem ise becom es so obvious that 
pretence is no longer possible. Prior to this, the gravity o f  illness is not discussed with  
the patient, particularly i f  he or she is young. Oftentimes, children fo llow  their parents 
lead and stop asking questions. Hospital visits to the patient are marked by hollow  
cheerfulness and oftentimes the staff collude in the conspiracy o f  silence. This deprives 
patient and parents o f  precious time, which could have been used to help both com e to 
terms with the imminent death.
2.2.3 Institutional Sequestration of the Elderly.
•3 3
Modernity removed madness, criminality, sickness and death from ordinary life . 
Modernity’s sequestration o f  such features, which were hitherto seen as ‘given ,’ was part 
o f  the m odem  project, described in an earlier section, which saw nature as something to
31 Philip Mellor, ‘Death in high modernity’, 20.
32 Mulkay, ‘Social Death in Britain’, 45.
33 Cf. Giddens, Modernity cmdSelf-Identity., 157.
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be transformed by human will. Social control over such extrinsic forces o f  nature took  
the form o f  incarceration. The mentally ill, criminals and the sick were segregated from 
normal society in the mental asylum, prison and hospital, respectively. Originally, such 
places were seen as ‘houses o f  correction’ whereby the individuals would be restored to 
society when they were able to function normally i.e. conform to  social conventions. 
However, ‘custody’ cam e to almost com pletely overshadow ‘cure’, with the main aim o f  
incarceration being to shield the normal society from alternative representations o f  
reality, which m ay lead to existential questions34. The latter could be repressed and the 
social-construct o f  reality protected i f  contact with social ‘deviants’ was avoided.
The same principle is at work today with regard to the elderly w ho remind us o f  death.
The causes o f  death have changed dramatically since the nineteenth century. Long­
term degenerative diseases have replaced short-term infectious diseases35. Mortality rates 
amongst children and young adults are low. Death today is concentrated amongst the 
elderly. The vast majority o f  people today die in a hospital setting. This reflects our 
desire to sequestrate death away from the public gaze. W e shut ourselves o ff  from those 
in whom  death becom es a more imminent concrete prospect. The presumed imminence 
o f  death amongst the elderly causes us to sequestrate them spatially in nursing homes. 
They are denied meaningful interaction with their fam ily just when they are likely to need 
it most36. ‘Whereas in som e pre-literate societies the unwanted old are physically buried 
alive, in our society they are immersed in residential homes where, out o f  sight and 
largely out o f  mind, they can be left whilst the process o f  biological decline takes its
34 Cf. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity., 157.
35Mulkay, ‘Social Death in Britain’ ,31.
15 Cf. Mellor, ‘Death in High Modernity’, 21. See also N. Elias, the Loneliness o f the Dying, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1985).
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inevitable course.’37 Those who place old people in hom es do so in the knowledge that 
they w ill not ‘com e out a live.’38
This awareness o f  the transition from ‘normal’ life to the home is so acute that they 
engage in ‘anticipatory g r ie f39. The elderly are mourned as i f  they are already dead, 
even though they may go on to live for many years in the nursing home. For all intents 
and purposes, the elderly are dead for those who live in the outside world. Even though 
the elderly may be visited in the home by their relatives, the sym bolic divide between the 
full actors in society, and the physically and socially sequestrated residents, makes any 
relationship between the two, little more than a pretence40.
This drive within the m odem  person, to separate h im self or herself apart from those 
w ho are near death, is present amongst the segregated elderly themselves. The ‘f it’ 
residents separate them selves form the ‘frail’. The elderly residents them selves 
vigorously ostracise the ‘frail’ residents, in order to find som e meaning in their own  
existence, rather than waiting for death. The home becom es a microcosm  o f  what is 
happening in society. The staff eagerly participate in the apartheid regime, spatially 
distancing the ‘fit’ from the ‘frail’. This allows them  to focus on the former and gives 
them a sense that the home is more than mere dying rooms. The staff interact differently 
with the two categories o f  elderly. They refer to death im plicitly and explicitly amongst 
the ‘frail’, whereas in their dealings with the ‘fit’, staff stressed their liveliness and talked
37Mulkay, ‘Social Death in Britain,’ 36. Here Mellor is quoting J. Goody, Death Property and the 
Ancestors {London: Tavistock Press, 1961).
38 Ibid., 36. See also. J. Hockey,(1985) ‘ Cultural and Social Interpretations o f “Dying” and “Death” in a 
Residential Home for Elderly People in the North East of England’, in Curare, 8(1): 35-43.




in ways that denied the immediate relevance o f  death.41 This served to foster a sense o f  
personal worth and social significance in the fit, which they clung to mercilessly. The 
unfortunate consequence for the frail, o f  the collusion between the fit and the staff, is that 
‘they are systematically excluded from participating in this last, ultimately impoverished 
setting, in much the same way that the elderly in general are excluded from the wider 
society.’42 Ironically, the ‘fit’ may die suddenly and the ‘frail’ long outlive them. The 
frail are rendered socially dead long before their biological death and so the transition 
from the home to the grave goes by largely unremarked.43
This whole idea o f  institutional sequestration may seem  more like a conspiracy theory, 
than a social theory, to som e readers. However, we can see evidence o f  such active 
segregation o f  the elderly from ‘normal’ society on a regular basis. Here in Ireland, for 
example, the health boards solution to the current beds crisis in our hospitals, is to  
remove the elderly, who are deem ed to be blocking beds. M inister for Health and 
Children, Mr. Martin, has provided funding for the health boards to m ove five hundred 
elderly patients from hospitals into nursing home beds. These ‘step dow n’ facilities are 
part o f  the Health Board’s strategy to free up hospital beds. Hospital Consultants rightly 
condemned the m ove, describing it as an ageist attitude. The Health and Children 
Correspondent for the Irish Times, after speaking to Consultant Geriatrician Dr. D es O ’ 
N eill, got to the heart o f  the matter when he wrote, ‘ I put quotation marks around “freed- 
up” because actually the beds w on’t be freed-up at all. They w ill be occupied by younger 
people. I f  you are an older person you are a bed blocker. If you are young, you are a
41 Cf. Mulkay, 1 Social Death in Britain,’ 37. Cf. Hockey, (1985) et al. J. Hockey., (1990), Experiences of 




patient occupying a bed, which has been “freed-up.”44 It seem s w e don’t even want the 
elderly sick to get the same treatment as ordinary sick people. They w ill receive separate 
and sub-standard care. Today, they’re blocking beds in hospitals. Tomorrow, maybe 
w e’ll find that we have no room for them anywhere at all. W e have already done this to  
them socially and to a great extent spatially. I f  this attitude is taken to its logical 
conclusion, the elderly in Ireland, like the elderly in Holland, w ill live in fear o f  being 
involuntarily euthanised. M edicine’s m ove from being a ministry o f  care, to a 
mechanistic-instrumentalist discipline, which will be discussed in the next chapter, sheds 
some light on how  this situation cam e about.
44 Padraig O’Morain, “Step-down” facilities to free more beds will only maroon the elderly in an ageist 
world’ in the Irish Times (3 January 2001), 5.
Chapter 3: Contemporary Attitudes Towards Suffering
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3.1 M EDICALISING SUFFERING
According to Ivan Illich, our society has been m edicalised to such an extent that it is no  
longer a culture (system o f  meaning), but a system o f  techniques and thus more properly 
called cosmopolitan medical civilisation1. M odem  m edicine is instrumental in 
modernity’s war against the contingency o f  nature. The human body is contingent 
because it is subject to outside forces, which cannot be controlled2. M odem  medicine 
seeks to counteract the loss o f  predictability and control incurred in sickness. D isease  
can cause anything from shortness o f  breath, loss o f  memory, tremors, seizures to 
uncontrolled expulsion o f  bodily fluids3. The latter is acceptable in infants, but when 
adults lose control they are stigmatised. Sick people are not held accountable for their 
sickness but for how  they present them selves. They are expected to conceal their 
contingency as best as possible in order to avoid embarrassing others with the spectre o f  
lost body control4. Sick people must suppress their spoilt identity with m edicines or 
hospitalisation in order to protect normal society from the sight o f  sickness, which is an 
intimation o f  mortality and the failure o f  the m odem  project.
Suffering is a distinctly human phenomenon because it requires not simply physical 
pain but awareness. Suffering is bound up with the contemplative or spiritual aspect o f  
our being as well as the bodily5. Human suffering begs the question, why? However, 
modernity has deprived suffering o f  its personal meaning and reduced it to the unifying
1 Cf. Ivan Illich, Limits To Medicine. Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation o f Health (London: Marion 
Boyars Publishers, 1995), 33.
2 Cf Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller. Body, Illness, and Ethics (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 31.
3 Ibid., 31.
4 Ibid.
5 Stan Van Hooft, ‘The Meanings o f Suffering’, in Hastings Center Report, 28 (1998), 13.
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view  o f  clinical medicine6. Human suffering has also becom e a matter o f  techne. 
Whereas traditional cultures make pain tolerable by integrating it into a meaningful 
setting and interpreting its necessity, cosm opolitan medical civilisation detaches pain 
from any social context or meaning in order to annihilate it7. M odem  m edicines single- 
minded telos o f  cure has dehumanised the patient’s experience o f  suffering and ironically 
sapped society o f  its ability to tolerate any level o f  pain.
3.1.1 Deconstructing Mortality.
Suffering and dying have been claimed by technocracy as malfunctions from which  
society must be institutionally relieved8. Suffering is a mystery and thus by its very 
nature doesn’t admit solution. It is therefore a scandal to modernity -  som ething it 
cannot control. But by reducing human suffering to physical pain, modernity has been  
able to reassert control. Over the last few  centuries the physician’s attitude to suffering 
has changed and with it m edicine’s interest from the sick to sickness9. The se lf  has been  
separated from the body; the latter being degraded to the status o f  a broken-down car 
which has inconvenienced its occupant. The hospital has been transformed into a 
‘compartmentalised repair shop’10 to deal with mechanical trouble. The threat o f  
mortality is denied by the specialisation o f  m odem  m edicine, which breaks down the 
human body into component parts. Bauman calls this ‘deconstructing mortality’11. B y  
dividing illness into discrete parts, organs or tissues, the mystery o f  suffering becom es a
6Cf. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 11.
7 Cf. Illich, Limits To Medicine, 134.
8 Cf. ibid., 132.
9 Cf. ibid., 138.
10 Ibid., 163.
nFrank, The Wounded Storyteller, 83; see also Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life 
Strategies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 167.
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series o f  puzzles which admit solution. The breakdown is thus fixable and sickness, as 
intimation that m y whole being is mortal, is forestalled12. This works for both patient and 
doctor. The latter concerns him self or herself with fixing this or medicating that and thus 
hasn’t to consider the big issue o f  mortality. Thus specialisation in M edicine facilitates 
deconstructing mortality. M eanwhile, the patient is distracted from the law o f  their 
being, by fulfilling a series o f  tests and treatments. The mystery o f  suffering, which can 
only be faced up to, doesn’t have to be, while w e still have puzzles to  solve.
3.2 SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF SUFFERING
Parson’s theory on the ‘sick role’ outlines what society expects from the sick person. The 
core obligation is that they present them selves to a health-care professional for treatment. 
This expectation is institutionalised and validated by social norms in matters such as sick  
leave from work and medical care.13 The sick  person is exem pt for normal obligations 
whilst under the care o f  a physician. The physician is an agent o f  social control in a 
twofold sense. His obligation is to ensure that the privilege o f  sick leave isn’t abused and 
that the patient receives medical attention so that they may return to normally functioning  
society as soon as possible. The physician regulates the time given to  patients to recover. 
He must ensure that the sick person is given enough to recover, but not too much, lest he 
or she produce a social dropout.
12 Cf. Frank, 86; see also William F. May, The Patient’s Ordeal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991).
13 Cf Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 81.
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‘The physician is there not to pander but to prod gently but firm ly’14. Parson’s theory 
doesn’t concede the failure o f  m odem  medicine to cure. This reflects the core 
expectation o f  society from the physician, which is restitution, in other words, that the 
doctor return them to society ‘as good as new ’. M odem  society inculcates this 
expectation. Stories o f  medical heroism are told to the exclusion o f  other stories o f  
illness. They are bought w holesale by the general population because people do in fact 
get better and even those who don’t get better want to go on believing that they w ill15.
However, the chronically ill or the silent ‘remission society’, both o f  which have 
temporary visa status in the healthy world, have long-since ceased to tell their story o f  
illness in terms o f  prospective restitution16. Their stories being o f  chaos, instead o f  
control, are suppressed in modernity. Oprah, the American chat-show queen, interviews 
recovering or recovered anything from alcoholic to nymphomaniac. Even i f  som eone  
enters the show in chaos, through the help o f  counsellors or health-care professionals, 
they leave a success story in the making. Advertisements for private hospitals or clinics 
and health insurance companies promise the possibility o f  outwitting suffering. V.H.I. 
promises to help us to ‘dance away the heartache, dance away the pain.’ The hype over 
the mapping o f  the human genom e w as irresponsible. It was not only generated by those 
in the fields o f  science and m edicine but by the U.S. President and Britain’s Prime 
Minister, This is a current example o f  Western society’s assertion o f  its preference for 
the restitution narrative even when the claims o f  cure are grossly exaggerated or at the 
very least still in the pipeline.
14 Ibid., 82.
15 Cf. ibid., 92.
16 Cf. ibid., 8.
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Science can never deliver a world free o f  suffering and yet it conditions people to expect 
and accept only restitution stories o f  illness. Chaos stories i.e. stories o f  illness, which 
don’t end in cure, rarely receive coverage because they provoke anxiety in others and 
represent the failure o f  the m odem  project. M ost people switch o f f  when they hear chaos 
stories whereas interviewers twist the story so as to end on a note o f  optimism. ‘In his 
analysis o f  how  interviewers elicit Holocaust stories, Langer notes that one device they 
use to keep the talk tolerable for them selves is to steer the witness toward what the 
interviewer takes as the end o f  the camp experience, liberation.’17 However, for the 
survivors, liberation is an almost bigger horror than what went before. In the words o f  
one survivor ‘Then I knew  m y troubles were really about to begin’.18 Liberation from  
hospital can provoke a not dissimilar horror: the trouble o f  finding purpose in a world 
which, has changed for the post-illness person, but to everybody else still looks the same. 
M odem  m edicine seeks to  return people to the world, exactly the same as they were 
before they became sick. But for many the experience o f  illness renders this impossible 
as a moral choice19. Yet society hasn’t got the ears to hear their story. Just as the 
interviewer o f  the Holocaust survivor tries to mould the story to what he wants to hear, 
society patronisingly tries to smooth away people’s pain. “Y ou’ll be fine,” is a comm on  
platitude even i f  it defies all logic and m edical prognosis. Visitors to hospital wards enter 
equipped with that phrase, a hollow  cheerfulness and a forced smile enough to bully any 
patient into false optimism. It can be very frustrating for sick people when others refuses 
to listen to their pain. A  com m on response to a chaos story is to  suggest a remedy. It
17 Ibid., 105, based on Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991),67.
18 Ibid., 106.
19 Cf. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 91.
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never enters the other person’s head that in the sick person’s case, a formula for health 
couldn’t be found. One Holocaust survivor told his story to a group o f  children in school 
and one child responded with an elaborate plan as to how  he could have escaped20.
The most common model o f  the restitution story is the TV  commercial for painkillers, 
non-prescription drugs and frequently cold remedies21. The commercial that springs to 
my mind advertises a comm on painkiller. A  man is grumpy in the morning because he 
had a headache and complains to his w ife that he can’t find the paracetamol. The 
harmony o f  the household, the m an’s ability to go to work or at least the m ood he is in 
when he arrives at work are at stake. The caring w ife provides the remedy, and is thus 
validated. The man pops a pill and kisses his w ife goodbye. She says, ‘Have a good  
day’. He replies “I w ill” to which she concludes aloud “He w ill” . Order is restored in the 
commercial and people are conditioned to expect the same in real life. There is no 
question in the advertisement o f  the remedy not being available. Therefore, future 
interruptions to health are expected to be finite and remediable. ‘In the extended logic o f  
restitution, future sickness already will have been cured’22. It is noteworthy that what 
cures the body is a com m odity23. This is why we are called healthcare consumers. We 
perceive our freedom as consumers. It is a freedom not to suffer24.
20 Cf. ibid., 102.
21 Cf. ibid., 79.
22 Ibid., 90.
23 Cf. ibid., 86.
24 O’ Donovan, Begotten or Made, 9.
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3.3 KILLING PAIN
Pain is no longer seen as ‘natural’ but as a ‘social curse from which society must be 
institutionally relieved’25. Anaesthetic consumers demand ‘artificially induced 
insensibility, unawareness and even unconsciousness’ and, in the context o f  the 
euthanasia debate, death. Pain came to be seen as a m echanical response, which can be 
regulated, measured, verified and objectified27. The physician was trained not to 
recognise the questions pain raises for the person. Instead, he records their pains in 
medical charts, which the patient isn’t allowed to read. H e uses a specialised abstract 
language, which deprives the patient o f  even meaningful words to describe their 
suffering. The physician is a master in the mechanics o f  pain. A  century and a half after 
pain had been reduced to a physiological entity, a m edicine labelled painkiller was 
marketed in La Crosse, W isconsin. When pain like everything else in the m odem  age 
was made a matter o f  techne, it seem ed rational to flee it rather than face it28. This 
marked a major departure from what had been a universal way o f  dealing with pain in 
traditional societies. The latter didn’t deny the necessity to bear pain. They took an 
integrated approach to dealing with pain, which included remedies, care, comfort and 
consolation. Their emphasis was on healing the person, not simply treating symptoms. 
They encouraged the individual to take responsibility for their experience, by fostering an 
art o f  suffering. Cultures have always provided m odels o f  behaviour in suffering, which
25 Cf. Illich, Limits To Medicine, 135.
26 Ibid.
27 Cf. ibid., 170, see also Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 5, 6.
28 Illich, Limits to Medicine, 152.
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encouraged people to bear their pain with dignity29. The saint, the martyr, the warrior 
and in the case o f  Christianity, God, encouraged the individual to a virtuous performance 
in suffering and gave their experience meaning. This gave rise to  a myriad o f  virtues and 
qualities to deal with pain e.g. courage, patience, forbearance, fortitude, resignation, self- 
control, perseverance, duty, love, fascination, prayers and com passion30. Compassion has 
becom e obsolete because pain has been deprived o f  any social context to give m eaning to 
the experience o f  the sick. Compassion has com e to mean the elimination o f  suffering at 
all costs, rather than sharing with som eone in their suffering or helping others bear their 
suffering. But the m odem  logic balks at this: why share in something that has no 
meaning?
3.3.1 Treating patients as pets.
It is something that our generation finds very hard to believe, but traditional societies 
were far more progressive in their attitudes to suffering or what w e would call ‘pain 
management’. They recognised that the human experience o f  pain is conditioned, not 
simply by the intensity o f  the pain stimulus or genetic factors, but by the way w e interpret 
pain, which hinges on our culture. The meaning w e ascribe to pain is instrumental in our 
capacity to tolerate it. A ll human suffering begs the question why?
29 Cf. ibid., 145.
30 Cf. ibid., 134.
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‘Observers that are blind to this referential aspect o f  pain are left with nothing but 
conditional reflexes. They are studying a guinea pig, not a human being’31. A  physician  
doesn’t com e close to understanding an individual’s suffering i f  he diffuses the value- 
loaded question and concerns h im self with managing a system ic entity. Anim als are used 
to test the effectiveness o f  “pain-killing” drugs or surgical interventions. The validity o f  
the results o f  these tests are verified on humans32. I f  both guinea pigs and humans live in 
experimental conditions, the effects o f  the drugs w ill be the same. However, in a normal 
situation, the affects o f  pain-killing drugs on the sick w ill not be directly in line with  
results obtained in controlled conditions. ‘In the laboratory people feel exactly like m ice, 
when their own life becom es painful they usually cannot help suffering, w ell or badly, 
even when they want to respond like m ice’33. It is a failure o f  compassion to treat 
‘patients like pets’34. Unfortunately, this situation will prevail under the clinical 
reduction o f  suffering to a physiological entity. Clinical m edicine admits no category for 
‘living a life o f  overwhelming suffering and trouble’35. W hen patients, who are treated 
like pets, act as humans and despair, it is documented as depression in order to redefine it
36as a treatable condition and hence place it within the framework o f  restitution . Clinical 
staff can once again take control. This is another example o f  the restitution narrative 
demanding dominance; ‘it denies chaos and requires chaotic bodies to be depressed and 
thus fixable’37. Prozac is just another painkiller. Drugs that change affective states are
31 Ibid., 142.
32 Cf. ibid., 143.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 152.
35Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 112.
36 Ibid., 110.
37 ru :  j
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philosophically suspect38. The same conspiracy o f  happiness which publicly denies 
death, and insists on telling sick people ad nauseam, you’re looking w ell, tries to enhance 
the patient’s psychic well-being by chem ical warfare. M odem  m edicine or psychiatry 
fails to recognise that anxiety is produced by alienation and prozac cannot “cure” our 
collective form o f  life or healthcare system in which alienation takes root39. Cases o f  
depression have increased in the United States from 50 people per m illion in the 1950’s 
to 100,000 per m illion today40. This tells us w e need to change the w hole ideology  
behind our society o f  which our healthcare system is the brainchild. Unfortunately, the 
technological mentality from which m odem  society operates, fails to see that there are 
certain areas o f  life in which technological intervention is inappropriate. ‘Sufferings o f  
the soul cannot be addressed nor ameliorated by chem icals.’41 This kind o f  palliation is 
an attempt to reassert order and control over inner suffering, but can actually exacerbate 
the situation by disconnecting the sufferer from their pain, thus inhibiting healing. 
‘Instead o f  covering up symptoms, com passion seeks connection with the sufferer, 
without seeking to negate suffering.’42 Time not tranquillisers, ‘com passion not 
palliation in the service o f  a quick fix, help suffering souls begin their healing.’43 W e 
need to leam  from traditional societies, w hich understood that strictly m edical factors are 
rarely the m ost crucial to healing. Otherwise, w e w ill continue to treat the loneliness o f  
the sick and the dying with drugs or even death.
38 Peter D Cramer, ‘The Valorization of Sadness’ in Hastings Center Report, 30 (2000), 13.
39 Carl Elliott, ‘Pursued by Happiness and Beaten Senseless’ in Hastings Center Report, 30 (2000),7.
40 David Healy, ‘Good Science or Good Business?’ in Hastings Center Report, 30 (2000),19.
41 Dan Dugan, ‘When Suffering is More than Physical Pain’ in The Park Ridge Center Bulletin, (Sept/Oct 
1997), 4.
42 Ibid., 5.
43Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 110.
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The role o f  the physician in m odem  society is to remove pain. This is a complete 
aberration in the history o f  Western civilisation. In the classical W est, ‘the Greeks didn’t 
even think about enjoying happiness without taking pain in their stride’44. They
understood pain as an inevitable reality in a flaw ed universe and saw it as something,
which helped the soul to evolve. For Aristotle, body and soul were in com plete unity. 
Hence, the language o f  bodily pain was equally applicable to  the soul. The tw o were 
divorced in Western thinking by Descartes45. Before this the idea o f  professional 
technical pain killing was alien to all European civilisations. First, as already intimated, 
because pain was ‘man’s experience o f  a marred universe, not a mechanical dysfunction 
in one o f  its sub-systems. The meaning o f  pain was cosm ic and mythic, not individual 
and technical’46. Second, as corruption was part o f  nature and so was man, one couldn’t 
eliminate suffering without eliminating the sufferer. Third, pain was an experience o f  
body and soul. There was no such thing as pain that wasn’t suffered47
One approach to pain was however unthinkable, at least in the
European tradition, the b e lie f that pain ought not to be suffered,
alleviated, and interpreted by the person affected, but that it should be 
-  ideally always -destroyed through the intervention o f  a priest, 
politician, or physician.48
3.3.2 The Traditional Approach to  Pain.






3.4 MORAL THEORY AND SUFFERING.
The moral theory o f  Proportionalism reflects society’s wider identification o f  progress 
with the reduction o f  the sum total o f  suffering. Proportionalism, as the name suggests, is 
concerned with bringing about a proportion o f  good over evil. “According to 
Proportionalism, an act w hich would otherwise be immoral can be justified morally i f  the 
overall good or evil involved in doing the action compares favourably with the overall 
good or evil which the avoidable alternatives would bring about”49. The emphasis is 
placed on the outcome o f  acts. Proportionalists believe that the moral agent must 
determine, prior to choice, which action w ill bring about the greatest good or the lesser 
evil and act accordingly. Secular ethicists known as ‘consequentialists’ are guided solely  
by the principle o f  the lesser evil. The m ost com m on form o f  consequentialism is 
utilitarianism. It has its roots in the classical secular b e lie f that there is really only one 
good that human action pursues, namely pleasure50. Therefore the central tenet o f  
utilitarianism is to bring about the greatest good or happiness for the greatest number o f  
people. Catholic proportionalists, com ing from a Christian perspective, reject the 
oversimplified identification o f  good with pleasure51. They also recognise that individual 
rights cannot be violated for the benefit o f  society.




They accept some moral absolutes e.g. that one should never seek to lead another into 
sin.52 However, they reject traditional Catholic absolutes e.g. thou shalt not deliberately 
take innocent human life.
Actions are morally evaluated by weighing up the good and bad effects. For example, in 
the case o f  direct abortion, the bad effect would be the intentional destruction o f  the 
unborn child whereas the good effects may include preservation o f  financial security, 
career prospects, existing relationships etc. The moral agent must decide for herself 
which values are m ost important to her. She subjectively constructs a hierarchy o f  goods. 
‘This approach seem s to suggest that there is no rational way to determine the lesser 
ev il’53. One doesn’t choose the moral good, one m erely decides arbitrarily what to call 
the moral good in accordance with one’s own personal preference.
A  morality o f  principles w ill use proportionality in moral evaluation when there are no 
moral absolutes at stake. However, i f  an act is wrong or immoral in itself, it cannot be 
done. Proportion doesn’t com e into it e.g. direct abortion w ill always and everywhere be 
wrong because it is the deliberate destruction o f  innocent human life. It precludes the 
overriding o f  a basic human good in the name o f  overall good. It holds that authentic 




The Christian faith has seen that there are in fact evil kinds o f  
deeds, deeds that always involve assaults upon the love o f  
persons. Such deeds must never be done; there can be no  
“proportionate reason” for doing them. W e must not do evil 
that good may com e o f  it”.54
Therefore, a morality o f  principles upholds universal absolutes or moral norms because
they are the requirements o f  genuine love. To do the right thing, even i f  it has tragic
consequences, is from the perspective o f  a morality o f  principles the lesser evil. Secular
consequentialists are more concerned with the foreseen effects o f  actions. Whereas the
classical moral tradition has always been more concerned that the faithful respect the
good. The latter has always been deemed more important than producing good effects or
having wonderful things happen in our lives.55 This attitude is not the result o f  a desire
for moral rectitude or insensitivity to human problems, but recognition that ours is a
fallen world -  and that our ability to make the world good is limited. This approach
acknowledges that plenty o f  actions w ill have unfortunate aspects to them and the only
realistic and moral attitude to take is to respect the good rather than engaging in
impossible calculations about the supposed outcome o f  actions in order ‘to create a world
in which the maximum possible amount o f  good is realised’.56
The latter invariably results in assaults against the goods o f  individuals. Instead o f  
trying to overreach our limits as human beings, we should accept that the problem o f  evil 
w ill not be solved in this world. A  morality o f  principles rejects the this-worldly 
approach o f  proportionalists and is open to the deeper meaning o f  human existence
54 Ibid., 92.
55 Cf. Lawler, Boyle and May, Catholic Sexual Ethics, 93,
56 Ibid., 91.
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revealed in Jesus Christ.57 It doesn’t show contempt for human tragedy but rests on the 
confidence that God w ill restore all that is good in the next life. The attempt o f  
proportionalists to bring about the maximum amount o f  good possible, rather than 
respecting sim ple requirements o f  love, reeks o f  utopianism. This moral theory reflects 
society’s wider dissatisfaction with the world ‘not because it was dreary or sinful or 
lacking in enlightenment or threatened by barbarians but because it was full o f  suffering 
and pain’.58
3.5 A RESIDUAL HORROR.
One would think society’s attempt to m inim ise suffering would have m axim ised  
happiness. It hasn’t. I already quoted statistics on depression, but a direct consequence 
o f  induced insensitivity to pain seem s to have been an inability to enjoy life ’s more 
simple pleasures. ‘Increasingly stronger stimuli are needed to provide people in an 
anaesthetic society with a sense o f  being alive’.59 Sports like bungy jum ping and sky  
diving have never been more popular. The use o f  more worrying stimuli like drugs and 
violence is on the increase. Our generation plays m usic louder because it seeks excitation 
through noise. The amount o f  young boys w ho get killed on the roads every year due to 
speeding is another example o f  destructive thrill seeking. It is salutary to note in the 
context o f  this study that the TV commercial supported by the National Safety Council,
57 Ibid., 92.
58 Illich, Limits to Medicine, 151.
59 Ibid., 152.
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whose slogan is ‘Slow  dow n boys,’ uses the image o f  a boy rendered disabled by a car 
accident to frighten young m en into driving slower. The abiding image o f  the boy, first 
shown speeding, is o f  him sitting in a wheelchair, in an empty gym, bouncing a 
basketball. The monotonous, repetitive thud o f  the ball hitting the ground, reinforces the 
dull look in his eyes. The m essage is clear; disability is more frightening for m ost people 
than death. M edical civilisation’s war against suffering has sapped the w ill o f  the people 
to suffer. The word suffering itself, nowadays, has superstitious undertones. The 
reminder that suffering is a responsible activity is ‘misinterpreted as a sick desire for 
pain: an obscurantism, romanticism, dolorism or sadism ’60. It is tantamount to 
advocating m asochism  in a world where only the self-punishment o f  the rat race is 
acceptable. Personal participation in facing up to the reality o f  unavoidable pain, is 
blasphemy in a consumer society. And yet this passive society still seeks stronger 
sensations by subjecting them selves to film s containing scenes o f  gratuitous violence. 
Gorer points out that as denial o f  natural death increased, so did our voyeuristic 
fascination with violent death.61
Today’s society cannot see in suffering a possible symptom o f  health. And yet health 
means, ‘to be able to feel alive in pleasure and in pain, it means to cherish but also to risk 
survival’.62 M edical civilisation, in seeing pain as a problem to be produced  out o f  
existence has opened up people to another kind o f  horror: the experience o f  artificial 
painlessness. Lifton gives an account o f  survivors o f  the bombing o f  Hiroshima who  
walked amongst the injured and dying in a state o f  numbness. ‘They experienced their
60 Ibid.
61 Gorer, ‘The Pornography of Death’, 51.
62 Illich, Limits to Medicine, 128.
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anaesthetised passage through this event as something just as monstrous as the death o f  
those around them, as a pain too dark and too overwhelming to be confronted, or 
suffered’.63 The cumulative affect o f  m odem  society’s expropriation o f  pain is similar to 
the experience o f  survivors o f  Hiroshima. It creates a residual horror. It leaves a dull 
after-taste o f  m eaninglessness. ‘The new  experience that has replaced dignified suffering 
is artificially prolonged, opaque, depersonalised maintenance. Increasingly, pain-killing  
turns people into unfeeling spectators o f  their ow n decaying selves’.64 Is it any wonder 
that people seek death as an emergency exit from this kind o f  horror? Similarly, society’s 
preference for the restitution narrative, to the exclusion o f  other stories o f  illness, means 
that people frame their experience in the language o f  survival. ‘Professional m edicine  
institutionalises having nothing to say beyond the language o f  survival’.65 Therefore, 
when those who have lived their experience o f  illness in the language o f  survival find that 
restitution is no longer on the cards e.g. terminal illness, they find they have nothing left 
to say. ‘It is a tragedy i f  having nothing left to say means that these people have no 
further use for them selves’.66 The technocracy o f  m edical civilisation that brought them  
to that place by treating patients as pets can then take technological intervention one 




66 Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 95,96.
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‘Compassion is an empathic sharing in the misfortunes o f  another’ 67 The original 
meaning is to suffer with someone (cum passio), but today it is taken to mean the 
elimination o f  suffering at all costs. In the case o f  euthanasia, the cost is the patient. In 
the case o f  abortion, the cost is a baby. Abortion has been embraced by m ost Western 
societies as a tool for eliminating suffering. Originally, it was designed to elim inate the 
suffering o f  the woman who didn’t want to be pregnant. Increasingly, it has been used to 
eliminate the suffering o f  babies themselves by killing them before they are bom  i f  they 
have defective genes or even rectifiable conditions like cleft palate. Death is deemed 
preferable to any level o f  suffering. B y  subjecting children to quality control tests before 
they are bom , w e reduce the amount o f  suffering in the world that healthy people must 
witness. This seem ingly makes life more pleasant for everyone. W om en who are 
expecting twins but wanted only one baby can ‘selectively reduce’ their pregnancy. The 
follow ing lyrics from a Leonard Cohen song called ‘The Future’ echoes Pope John Paul 
II’s criticism o f  our culture o f  death: ‘Destroy another fetus now / We don’t like children 
anyhow.’68 M ost Western nations have below  replacement fertility because children 
require parents to  make sacrifices and ‘giving up som ething w e want for the sake o f  
something worthier, frustrates our desires and might for that reason be thought o f  as 
suffering’69.
3.6 THE RIGHT NOT TO SUFFER
67 Raymond Jaffe, ‘Conservatism and the Praise of Suffering1, in Ethics, 77 (1967), 255.
68 John J. Rock, ‘Evangelium Vitae: Some Highlights’ in Linacre Quarterly, 64 (1997), 6.
69 Stan Van Hooft, ‘The Meaning of Suffering’, in Hastings Center Report, 28 (1998), 15.
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‘There is a wide spread b e lie f that stress, pain, confusion and disappointment are 
unmitigated evils to be shunned or ‘cured’ at all costs, that unruffled happiness or 
contentment are a human right, that a ‘normal” life should be free o f  any sort o f  anxiety, 
conflict or vexation’.70 This is why m odem  members o f  society (I don’t use the term 
citizens because most are unwilling to contribute to the w hole even by voting) conceive  
o f  their freedom passively, as a ‘freedom not to suffer’.71 ft is freedom not to be imposed  
upon even in the interests o f  the com m on good.. It demands freedom from the limits o f  
morality and the ‘com m on-sense restrictions that have to be placed on one’s personal 
rights when they collide with those o f  another person.’72 H ence the right to life ‘has 
com e to mean the right to enjoy life -  the right to be let alone” \  This generation 
uncompromisingly asserts its rights but refuses to accept its responsibilities. The 
rejection o f  suffering manifests itse lf  in a refusal to suffer with someone, in other words 
to be compassionate. Thus m odem  ‘com passion’ looks for a quick-fix elim ination o f  
suffering. For example, Irish society welcom ed short-term Kosovar refugees into the 
country but exhibits widespread resistance to long-term Rom anian refugees. People 
suffer from compassion fatigue when problems aren’t short-term.
Only our consumer society could produce advertisements for products, which show a 
complete lack o f  regard for the suffering o f  other peoples. One abstract commercial in a 
glossy magazine caught m y attention. It read “m illions are starving every day”. It was
70 JohnF.X. Harriott, ‘The Aspirin Society’ in The tablet, 244 (1990), 334.
71 O’Donovan, Begotten Or Made?, 10.
72 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. The Impoverishment o f Political Discourse. (New York: The Free 
Press, 1991), 20.
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an advertisement for a nourishing conditioner for hair. Another example o f  this kind o f  
fickleness is an advertisement which reads ‘free the unjustly im prisoned’. It wasn’t part 
o f  a campaign by Amnesty International but belonged to a footwear company -  the 
unjustly imprisoned were feet, which should be in sandals for the summer months. The 
latter are obvious examples o f  a failure o f  compassion but m ost m odem  examples are 
subtler. It is the kind o f  com passion that can identify with a wom an with unplanned 
pregnancy, but not the baby she carries. It is ‘a virtue o f  m otivation rather than o f  
reasoning’74. It rushes to action without considering what is in fact the right course o f  
action. It presupposes that an answer has already been found to the question o f  what to 
do. Inevitably, in our fast m oving society, compassion is m eted out with super­
efficiency. I f  a woman becom es pregnant as the result o f  rape, she is offered the 
surgeon’s table instead o f  a listening ear. Society assumes it’s the obvious answer. The 
rape victim  is made to feel like she is carrying a monster, not a baby. I f  people actually 
took the time to look into the matter, they might think differently. One woman, Sandra 
Makhom, conducted a study researching the experience o f  pregnant rape victims. She 
interviewed a number o f  wom en, som e o f  whom had their babies (and either kept them or 
gave them up for adoption) and who aborted their babies. M akhom  discovered that o f  




said o f  those who had had abortions. The women, whose cases were reviewed in the 
study, who let their babies live, said it had helped to heal the horrific experience o f  rape 
because by having their babies they had responded with com passion to an innocent child  
even though they them selves had been treated with brutality and violence. O f the rape 
victim s who had abortions, many experienced the abortion as a second violation and felt 
that it had exacerbated feelings o f  anger and low  self-esteem  caused by the rape.751 think 
the true example o f  com passion is not our society’s approach, which pressurises rape 
victim s into abortion, but is shown by rape victims them selves who choose to let their 
babies live. That decision is not easy and undoubtedly involves grave suffering and 
sacrifice, but it truly is compassion. Unfortunately, today’s society can see no value 
whatsoever in suffering. It does not have the patience and selflessness that true 
compassion requires, so it carries out acts o f  grave cruelty e.g. abortion and euthanasia, in  
the name o f  compassion.
In the next chapter, w e see this short-term com passion at work in relation to disabled 
newborn babies and dying patients. The “better o f f  dead” approach is almost a 
perversion o f  the calm acceptance o f  death in the M iddle Ages. I keep referring to a 
refusal to accept death in contemporary society. This is true because death is not 
accepted as a mystery or as something we must go through, but is dominated and 
controlled. However, manipulation takes the form o f  a kind o f  glamorisation o f  death 
when it com es to those who are suffering. Death, it seem s, must be accepted at the 
earliest possible opportunity. Against this cultural backdrop, the Irish M uslim religious 
leader, at the Oireachtas Hearings on the Constitution said, in relation to the suggestion
75 Cf. Sandra Mahkorn, ‘Pregnancy and Sexual Assault’ in Psychological Aspects o f Abortion, Mall and 
Watts (eds) 5(1997).
58
that non-viable babies be aborted: ‘i f  they had only one day to live, let them live it.’ 
Unfortunately, his kind o f  thinking is not currently en vogue. The m ost dangerous place  
for a baby to be today is in his or her mother’s womb. I’m  afraid that it is becom ing  
increasingly dangerous for so-called defective newborns (a term I abhor because it is 
generally used in relation to goods) to be in hospital. A  calculated regime o f  neglect is 
increasingly being em ployed in paediatrics in order to deal with ‘lives not worth living.’ 
Inappropriate quality o f  life judgements, leading to  euthanasia, are being im posed on  
patients at both ends o f  the spectrum o f  life.
Autonomy is put forward as the main argument for euthanasia. The next chapter 
demonstrates that a false notion o f  freedom is certainly a major contributory factor in the 
acceptance o f  euthanasia. However, the treatment o f  disabled neonates, and other factors 
discussed later, show that at the heart o f  this debate is a refusal to suffer or to tolerate any 
level o f  suffering in the world.
Chapter 4: The Euthanasia Debate in its Cultural Context
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4.1 DEFINING EUTHANASIA
The word euthanasia com es from the Greek ‘eu ! and ‘thanatos5 meaning good death.1 
Euthanasia today generally refers to  mercy killing. ‘B y euthanasia is understood an 
action or om ission o f  an action which o f  itse lf or by intention causes death in order that 
all suffering be eliminated.’2 An exam ple o f  euthanasia by com m ission is i f  a doctor 
were to inject a patient with a lethal dose o f  a drug in order to induce death.' Euthanasia 
can be performed equally by om ission e.g. i f  ordinary means to sustain life or indeed  
normal care e.g. food and water are withdrawn or withheld from a patient.4 Proponents 
o f  euthanasia generally advocate the competent consenting patient m odel.5 The notion o f  
autonomy is central to their argument. Death must not only be beneficent but the free 
choice o f  a competent patient.6 They support voluntary euthanasia which, put simply, is 
the deliberate intervention o f  a doctor to kill a competent patient at their request.7
Involuntary euthanasia involves the killing o f  a patient with the intent to relieve 
suffering, without the patient’s consent. For some, this term applies to any case o f  killing  
without the patient’s consent.8 However, others reserve the term for those capable o f  
giving consent, namely competent patients. They assign the term non-voluntary
1 Cf. Gerard Dworkin, Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide (Cambridge New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998),108.
2B. M. Ashley and K. D O’Rourke, HealthCare Ethics. A Theological Analysis, 4Ul ed., (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1997), 417.
3 Cf. Canadian Bishops/Senate Testimony, ‘What Euthanasia Is and What it is Not’ in Origins, 24(1994) 
394.
4 Cf. ibid., 394.
5 Cf. Gerard Dworkin, Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide, 68.
6 Cf ibid.
7Cf. Richard M Gula, Euthanasia: Moral and Pastoral Perspectives (Mahwah, N.J: Paulist Press, 1994), 6.
8Cf ibid.
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euthanasia for incompetent patients e.g. infants, the mentally ill or brain damaged who  
cannot give consent.9
The terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia are discounted by many because o f  their 
potential to confuse. The term ‘passive euthanasia’ is em ployed by som e to describe the 
withholding or withdrawal o f  treatment, which is not m edically indicated or 
proportionate.10 However, the use o f  the adjective “passive” ‘contributes to the notion 
that the removal o f  life support is unethical even when the treatment is futile or the 
burdens disproportionate to the benefits.’11 One o f  the best ways to gain acceptance for 
the unacceptable is to confuse it with what is in fact acceptable.12 For this reason most 
people in the m ovem ent for life reserve the term euthanasia for acts or om issions 
intended to bring about death.13
A further classification is at work in the euthanasia debate. If a physician does not 
administer death personally but helps the patients to kill them selves by providing the 
tools for death e.g. poison or pills, this is called physician-assisted suicide.14 The latter 
appeals to many that reject straightforward euthanasia.15 It creates the illusion o f  a 
distance between the doctor and death - dealing and in som e minds helps protect the 
medical profession’s integrity. For others, it is ‘a thinly veiled attempt to soften or 
camouflage what is really being done because w e expect physicians to care for human 
life, not take it.’16
Cf. Episcopal Diocese of Washington, D C on Medical Ethics, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, Christian 
Moral Perspectives (Washington, DC: Morehouse Publishing, 1997),12, 13.
l0Cf. Bonnie Steinbock, Killing and Letting Die (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980) 63.
11 Canadian Bishops, ‘Euthanasia’, 394.
12 Cf. Gula, Euthanasia, 5.
13 Cf. Episcopal Diocese of Washington., 13.
14 Cf. Gula, Euthattasia, 6.
15 Cf. Episcopal Diocese of Washington.,14.
16 Canadian Bishops, ‘Euthanasia’, 394.
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Ethically, whatever about legally, it makes no difference because either way the 
physician bears moral-responsibility for death.17 ‘Putting the means in the patient’s 
hands falls little short o f  administering them .’18 Physicians who assist suicide do so 
because they believe it is a morally acceptable means to relieve suffering.19 Such formal 
co-operation with an evil is morally unacceptable. Even i f  a physician expressed view s  
to the contrary but merely went along with the patient’s w ishes, his actions cannot be 
justified. ‘One has a prima facie obligation not to assist ev il.’20 In short, the distinction  
makes no difference to the values at stake in the euthanasia debate and so many ethicists 
ignore it for the purposes o f  moral discussion. I w ill do likewise.
The possibility o f  murder by om ission is real. O m ission is not merely the same as 
doing nothing.21 Omission refers to the failure to do what ought to have been done. 
Positive action carries the presumption o f  intentionally whereas with om ission the 
intention is not as clear. I f  an act is omitted intentionally to bring about death, the agent 
is as culpable as i f  he or she had performed a positive act to achieve the same purpose. 
However, an agent may neglect to perform an act for morally exculpating reasons. But i f  
the agent’s reasons were not exculpating, they bear the responsibility for the result o f  
their voluntary action even though it was not intended.22
17 Cf. Gula, Euthanasia, 6.
18 Hans Jonas, ‘ The Right To Die’ Thomas A. Shannon (ed.), Bioethics, 3rd ed , (Mahwah,, New Jersey: 
Paulist Press, 1987), 203.
19 Cf. Patrick Norris, ‘ The Movement Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Step in the Wrong Direction’
in Linacre Quarterly, 63(1995), 36.
20 Ibid, 37.
21 Luke Gormaily, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law (London.Linacre Centre for Healthcare 
Ethics, 1994),46.
22 Cf. Gormaily, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law, 47.
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The follow ing is a treatment o f  the circumstances in which the withholding or withdrawal 
o f  means to sustain life is justifiable and does not constitute euthanasia.
4.1.1 Ordinary/Extraordinary M eans
I f  a person is ill they are generally obliged to seek help to get better or i f  this is not 
possible, to m inim ise symptoms23. However, there are lim its to the lengths we are 
obliged to go to sustain life. Catholic moral teaching uses the terms ordinary and 
extraordinary to describe treatments, which are morally obligatory or non-obligatory 
respectively24. In m edicine, these terms have a different meaning. ‘Physicians use 
“ordinary” to describe an accepted or standard m edical procedure. A procedure or 
m edicine that is new  or untested or still in the experimental stage is called  
“extraordinary.”’25The status o f  treatment as obligatory or optional, in Catholic moral 
teaching, depends on the patient’s particular condition and sensibilities. Treatment, 
which constitutes a grave burden for one patient, m ay be quite tolerable for another26. 
Ordinary means to prolong life may be defined as ‘all m edicines, treatments, and 
operations, which offer a reasonable hope o f  benefit to the patient without excessive  
expense, pain or burden.,27 Extraordinary means do not fulfil the above criteria and are 
thus optional. The terms ‘proportionate’ and ‘disproportionate’ are advocated by several 
ethicists such as M cCormick who believe that the existing terms are circular. The terms 
they suggest are indeed apt to describe the underlying m eaning o f  the traditional terms i f
23 Cf. Luke Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice arid the Law, 63.
24 Cf. Ashley and O’Rourke, HealthCare Ethics, 420.
25 Ibid.
26 Cf. Luke Gormally, Euthanasia Clinical Practice and the Law, 63.
27 Ashley and O’Rourke, HealthCare Ethics, 420.
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properly defined. However, they carry ‘the risk o f  succum bing to the proportionalist 
m ethodology on which the modernists rely, but which the encyclical the Splendour o f  
Truth (John Paul II, 1993) has been rejected by the church28.’ The proportionalist theory, 
as outlined in the second chapter, pennits the direct killing o f  innocent human beings if  
doing so serves to bring about a proportion o f  good over evil. The traditional terms retain 
the ethical principle, contrary to proportionalism, that euthanasia or any form o f  direct 
killing is always and everywhere wrong. At the same time they reflect the legitim acy o f  
letting die when the benefits o f  treatment are disproportionate to the burdens29.
4.2 KILLING/LETTING DIE DISTINCTION
The most obvious reason for rejecting treatment is i f  it is straightforwardly futile. 
Unfortunately, in discussing the legitimate refusal o f  treatment, it is necessary to make 
the point that no one is obliged to undertake useless treatments30. Society’s denial o f  
death is often carried into hospitals so that long after the possibility o f  cure has gone and 
focus should be on care, dying patients are offered potentially ‘life-saving’ treatment. It 
is a testament to realism, not fatalism, to reject such treatments. Few  cases o f  
burdensomeness are as straightforward as this. A ssessing the burdens o f  m ost treatments 
involves consideration o f  risk, pain, suffering, strain on relatives, financial loss, time 
expended, medical resources31. Burdens can be personal and social; they can refer to the 
patient or those in attendance on the patient. The benefits o f  treatment must be assessed  
in the light o f  the above factors. A  patient may reject treatment on the grounds that the 
proposed benefits are utterly disproportionate to the burdens. However, a patient may
28 Ibid.
29 Ashley and O’Rourke, Healthcare Ethics, 421.
30 Cf Gormally, Euthanasia Clinical Practice and the Law, 63.
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also legitimately refuse treatment, which promises great success but involves the burden
'Z ’j
o f  mutilation or a painful convalescence .
The intention o f  the patient is central to determining whether their decision to reject 
treatment is suicidal or ethically sound. For example, a patient in the final stages o f  a 
terminal illness may choose to forego treatment such as antibiotics, which is not in itself  
burdensome, but may no longer appear beneficial. This may be the result o f  a decision  
that life itself is no longer beneficial and that they’re better o f f  dead. Alternatively, it 
may be a manifestation o f  acceptance o f  their condition and the inevitability o f  death. 
The latter decision, unlike the former, is not a rejection o f  life  because the patient does 
not seek to hasten death but believes treatment to be no longer worthwhile, being already 
dying33. A  third patient m ay choose not to spurn what little tim e the antibiotics m ay  
afford. In both cases the patient’s attitude is life affirming and their actions are good34.
In a person’s intention (what they are precisely aiming to achieve as distinct from  
m otive which prompts us to action) lies the difference between killing and letting die. It 
is possible to kill someone or let them die for what are considered to be humane motives. 
However, whatever the m otive, the intention/purpose/object to bring about death is 
opposed to respect for human life .35 It is salutary to note that not seeking to prolong life  
can, at times, e.g. as in the circumstance outlined earlier, be compatible with respect for 
life or even a requirement o f  such respect. Unfortunately, som e ethicists use the term 
‘letting d ie’ as a euphemism for not allowing patients, such as neonates with a poor
31 Cf. ibid., 63.
32 Cf. ibid.
33 Cf. ibid., 65.
34 Cf. ibid., 66.
35 Cf.Iglesias, Study guide to ‘Euthanasia and Clinical Practice, (London, The Linacre Centre, 1984), 89.
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quality o f  life, to live. Others try to deny any moral difference between acts o f  om ission  
aimed at bringing about som eone’s death and letting die when treatment is non - 
obligatory. The denial o f  a morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die is 
not the result o f  a desire to protect life or to promote an im possible moral concern. It is 
rather an attempt to muddy the waters i.e. break down the distinction between killing and 
letting die in order to gain acceptance for euthanasia36. James Rachels, the H em lock  
Society and the Society for the right to die, take this approach37.
R achels’s case against the killing/letting die distinction com es down to what he calls 
the ‘bare difference’ argument.38 To make his point he tells a story about two characters 
called Smith and Jones who both stand to gain an inheritance i f  their respective young  
cousins die. Smith approaches his young cousin w hile he is bathing and drowns him. 
Jones approaches his cousin with the same intent but before he gets to him his cousin hits 
his head o ff  the bath and begins to drown. Jones does nothing to save him. R achels’s 
attempt to discredit the traditional killing/letting die distinction doesn’t work because the 
intent in both cases is to bring about death. Both characters have the same aim. 
R achels’s argument, however, is a powerful articulation o f  the fact that there is no  
morally significant difference between murder by com m ission or omission. Rachels 
doesn’t prove the thesis he set out to prove.
Intention is crucial to the killing and letting die distinction. Y et in his exam ple both 
Jones and Smith had the same wicked intention. He is right to say that their actions differ 
only in movement o f  bodily parts. The traditional v iew , which upholds the killing/letting
36 Cf. ibid., 17.
37 Cf. J.P. Moreland, review of ‘ The End of Life, ’ by James Rachels, The Thomist, 53 (1989), 714.
38 Cf. ibid., 720.
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die distinction, places great emphasis on the direction o f  the will. As outlined earlier, 
killing by com m ission or om ission aims at death, the intent is to bring about death. In 
letting die the intent/aim is to avoid em ploying futile or excessively burdensome 
treatment. The motives in both cases can be what the agent considers humane, but a good  
motive cannot validate a bad intent 39which, in this context, is to bring about death. 
Rachels fails to understand this distinction because he fails to understand the relationship 
between intention and action. He asks us to consider a second scenario.40 Jack and Jill 
both visit their grandmother and cheer her up. However, what Jack intended to do was 
for its own sake whereas Jill’s intent was to cheer up her grandmother in order to get a 
mention in her will. Jacks intent was good; Jill’s wicked; yet Rachels believes they  
performed the same action. M otionally they did, but morally they did not. H e fails to  
realise that physical m ovem ent is just part o f  an action. Our purpose forms our actions. 
Motivation m oves us to action but intention is what w e choose to do41. M otivation 
accompanies acts but intention constitutes them. The moral difference between the tw o  
cases for Rachels is reducible to Jack’s having a good character and Jill a bad one. But, 
Jack and Jill’s acts are morally different because o f  the intention. Jack’s action was 
loving; Jill’s action was mercenary. Rachels fails to  debunk the traditional distinction 
between killing and letting die because he makes a poor case for intentions being separate 
from actions.
39 Cf. Iglesias, Study guide to Euthanasia, 17.
40 Cf Moreland, review of James Rachels, The End of Life, 719.
41 Cf. Iglesias, Study guide to Euthanasia, 17.
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Autonomy is the central argument in the moral defence o f  euthanasia.42 In the prevailing 
climate o f  moral relativism, autonomy is seen as the one absolute. I suspect that the 
principle o f  autonomy which, has as its core value self-determination,43 is revered in 
contemporary culture precisely because it is a panacea for m odem  society’s failure to 
agree on a shared set o f  values. Autonomy gives everyone a licence to choose (their own  
concept o f  a good life)44 thus allow ing for what Engelhardt calls ‘peaceable 
community’45. The interpretation o f  autonomy, which has gripped the popular 
imagination, is that o f  ethical liberalism 46 The rights o f  individuals and free choice are 
absolutised. N o  one can deny that autonomy is o f  great good. Indeed, our human dignity 
is tied up with our com m on nature as beings bestow ed with the twin-gifts o f  reason and 
freedom. However, popular culture believes that the ‘sheer-fact’ o f  choice is the sole  
right-making characteristic o f  an action.47. Choice has been detached from content and 
rights from responsibilities. The pro-choice m ovem ent’s slogan “the right to choose” 
illustrates this. Choice must be respected even i f  it contradicts human welfare. In theory, 
ethical liberalism im poses limits on personal autonomy. One must respect the free 
choices o f  others and do no harm.48 However, in practice w e have undergone such a 
revolution in our self-confidence as human beings that w e fail to consider or care how
42 Cf. Gula, Euthanasia, 8.
43 Cf. ibid., 9.
44 Cf ibid.
45 Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence. Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, 
and the Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986), 9.
46 Gula, Euthanasia, 8.
47 Richard A McCormick, Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology (Kansas city: Sheed & Ward, 
1994), 171.
48 Gula, Euthanasia, 9.
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our choices effect others. Abortion is perhaps the most blatant example o f  this. Even in 
less critical circumstances w e v iew  ourselves as radically individual, isolated and 
independent subjects rather than as relational and social beings. If we truly grasped that 
no man is an island we would realise that our autonomous choices have a ripple effect.
4.3.1 Bioethics, M edicine and Autonom y
Alm ost from the outset bioethics gravitated toward an ethics o f  autonomy. This was a 
natural and necessary reaction to  medical paternalism. It represented an attempt to 
humble the power o f  physicians and gain recognition for patient rights and the need for 
informed consent49. Autonom y started out as the battle cry o f  the oppressed but 
degenerated into a rallying cry for those who elevate personal choice above all other 
moral considerations and values.50 The patients rights m ovem ent went into overkill and 
bioethics as a field neglected the concepts o f  moral responsibility and the com m on good.
An ethics o f  autonomy had as its m odel for the doctor-patient relationship the business 
contract.51 The patient became an autonomous agent, which demanded a service to be 
provided by the doctor. M edicine has been transformed from a profession determined by 
an internal ethic, the Hippocratic oath and a profound commitment to care for the sick, to  
a consumer industry. 52Engelhardt approves o f  an ethos o f  freedom in which the doctor 
becom es a high-powered mail carrier who delivers a m edical journal or pom magazine
49 Cf Daniel Callahan, ‘Bioethics,’ 7.
50 Cf. Thomas H Murray, ‘Communities Need More Than Autonomy’ in Hastings Center Report, 24 
(1994), 32.
51 Cf. ibid.
52 Hauerwas, Suffering Presence, 9.
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with equal reliability.53 In moral theory and m edical practice, our ethics o f  autonomy 
reduces loyalty, integrity, solidarity and other such moral concepts to interesting 
curiosities or idiosyncratic preoccupation.54 Unfortunately, there is nothing in his ethos 
o f  freedom, outside o f  market forces, to tell us why society should set aside som e o f  its 
members to care for the ill. There is nothing in his theory to support a moral commitment 
to care for the sick, disabled and dying.55 His freedom  easily  turns into tyranny o f  the 
powerful over the weak. Hauerwas believes that ‘a peaceable community is finally 
possible, not when there is merely a w illingness to live and let live, but only when  
freedom is supported by a profound commitment to  the protection and care o f  each 
person’s life .’56 To sum up, in underwriting the demands o f  autonomy, bioethics has 
created a moral vacuum.57 Autonomy does not counsel us to ask what is the right thing to 
do but rather asks is the decision free.58 Attention is diverted away from the moral 
character or content o f  choice. Moral responsibility is overshadowed by freechoice. 
Bioethics as a field fails to capture or convey the idea that individual autonomous choices 
sooner or later create a culture. What o f  the com m on good?
4.3.2 The Common Good
The common good argument hasn’t gained a foothold in the euthanasia debate because it 
is countercultural.59 The slippery slope or thin edge o f  the wedge argument does not bear 
much resonance in the current climate o f  ethical liberalism. Individuals are encouraged
53 Cf. ibid.
54 Cf. Murray, ‘Communities need More than Autonomy’, 32.
55 Hauerwas, Suffering Presence, 15.
56 Ibid., 14.
57 Cf Callahan, ‘Bioethics’, 29.
58 Cf. Murray, ‘Communities need More Than Autonomy’, 32.
59 Cf. Gula, Euthanasia, 18.
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to pursue and satisfy their personal goals without regard for how  it impacts on the w ell - 
being o f  society.60 M oreover, rampant individualism has made people sceptical o f  the 
concept o f  the comm on good itself. Many people do not believe that there could be a 
good for the collective beyond that which each individual subjectively perceives to be 
good.61 In a post-Christian culture, there is little sense o f  the human person as a social 
being. The Christian tradition has always affirmed that the good o f  the person emerges in 
relationship, not in isolation.62 In any case, relationship is a given. It’s not som ething we 
necessarily choose, it just is. The catholic moral tradition recognises limits to personal 
freedom in order to protect the dignity o f  every human being.63 It rejects an individualist 
interpretation o f  rights.64 Rights in the Christian understanding bind us together by 
fostering mutual respect in our com m on life. They look to the other person, not to 
oneself. To sum up, the principle o f  the common good is an integral part o f  the catholic 
tradition on social justice. It recognises the need to assess individual choices in the light 
o f  social responsibilities.65
Euthanasia is a profoundly social decision. Any death is not simply a personal matter. 
It effects the lives o f  many people. Euthanasia involves the one to be killed, the one 
doing the killing and hence his or her entire profession and a compliant society.66 
Autonomy hardly seem s an adequate justification for a decision, which has far reaching
60Cf. ibid.
61Cf. Gula, Euthanasia, 15.
62 Cf. Canadian Bishops, ‘Euthanasia’, 394.
63 Cf. ibid., 395.
64 Cf. ibid.
65 Gula, Euthanasia, 15.
66 Ibid., 18.
72
social implications. Individuals have duties in justice to other members o f  society.67 The 
suicide o f  an individual person affects the entire collective by discouraging others in their 
task o f  living.68 The experience o f  euthanasia in the Netherlands shows the social effect 
o f  personal choice. What started as individual autonomous choice degenerated into an 
involuntary euthanasia for many o f  Holland’s elderly?69 Euthanasia is an area in which  
the interests o f  the individual simply cannot be separated from the common good.70
4.3.3 Human Freedom
In the encyclical Veritatis Splendour, John Paul II spoke o f  “an illusory freedom apart 
from truth its e lf ’.71 He was referring to the current crisis in morality ow ing to the 
contemporary denial o f  the dependence o f  freedom on truth. (VS n.32.) Freedom itse lf  
becom es the source o f  values. (VS n.32.) A  primacy o f  conscience is asserted over a 
primacy o f  truth. Conscience no longer judges the truth but decides “autonomously” 
according to subjective criteria what to call the truth e.g. “being at peace with  
o n e se lf’.(VS n.32.) The pope rejects such moral theories, which make the subject 
interpret the criterion for good and evil. He condemns utilitarian moral theories such as 
‘consequentialism’ and ‘proportionalism’.(VS n.75.) M oreover, he asserts against such 
theories that there are acts, regardless o f  intention and circumstances, which are 
intrinsically evil. (VS n.75.)
67 John Finnis, ‘A philosophical case against Euthanasia’ in John Keown (ed.), Euthanasia Examined. 
Ethical, Clinical and Legal perspectives (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 33.
68 Ashley and O’ Rourke, HealthCare Ethics, 420.
69 John L Fleming, ‘Euthanasia; human rights and inalienability’ in Linacre Quarterly, 63 (1996),49.
70 Canadian Bishops ‘Euthanasia’, 396.
71 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Veritas Splendor, n. l.Flereafter, VS and cited in body of text.
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The Christian tradition does not equate freedom with control. True freedom rests in  
embracing the truth. (VS n .41.) The moral law is freedom. M oreover, the Christian 
tradition recognises ‘that only the God o f  Creation has absolute dom inion over creation 
and that creatures share in his dominion in a limited sense i.e. as stewards.72 John Paul II 
sums up this freedom w ell when he says:
The man is certainly free, inasmuch as he can understand and accept 
God’s commands. And he possesses an extremely far-reaching 
freedom, since he can eat o f  every tree o f  the garden”. But his 
freedom is not unlimited; it must halt before the “tree o f  the 
knowledge o f  good and evil” for it is called to accept the moral law 
given by God. In fact, human freedom finds its authentic and 
complete fulfilment precisely in the acceptance o f  that law. (VS n.
35.)
The forbidden fruit in the Garden o f  Eden sym bolises a mastery o f  life and autonomy 
inappropriate for being human.73 The reality o f  death itse lf points to our limited mastery 
over our own lives. To seek to control death through euthanasia is to seize for on e-self a 
divine prerogative. Our freedom in death is the freedom w e have in any situation in 
which w e feel like we are not in control, namely the attitude w e take to our situation. W e 
can exercise our freedom in death by choosing to surrender to God in calm acceptance o f  
our creaturehood. However, our freedom does not legitim ately extend to absolute control 
over the time and manner o f  death.
72 Gula, Euthanasia, 13
73 Ibid., 12.
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The autonomous individual in control o f  his destiny has been glamorised to  such an 
extent that dependency is seen as an intolerable indignity. This is why many people v iew  
death as preferable to disability and why many choose to  take control o f  the precise time 
and manner o f  their death rather than suffer the vulnerability o f  dying. Euthanasia w ill 
always appear tempting i f  w e see the individual as the centre o f  the universe. It’s 
frightening to face death as an ego. The Christian faith encourages us to face death as a 
radically relational subject that is never alone but exists and is sustained in solidarity with 
fellow  human beings and the trine se lf  o f  the One God.74
The identification o f  human dignity with autonomy is pivotal in many pro - euthanasia 
arguments. John Harris advocates for euthanasia on the grounds that w e respect human 
dignity only to the extent that we respect personal autonomy.75 He believes that human 
life isn’t intrinsically valuable. The value o f  our lives is subjective. I f  the individual 
doesn’t value his or her ow n life then it isn’t valuable! Euthanasia in such a case is 
perfectly legitimate because it destroys nothing o f  value. The problem with the 
understanding o f  human dignity as wholly dependent on autonomy is that the lives o f  
those who, for whatever reason, do not possess or cannot exercise even minimal capacity 
for choice, are worthless. Human life itself, according to  Harris is not valuable, only
4.3.4 Autonomy and Human Dignity
74 Dermot A. Lane ‘ The Changing Experience of Death’ in Doctrine And Life, 7(1996), 429.
75 John Finnis, ‘A philosophical case against euthanasia’, 44.
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certain individual lives.76 He calls such human beings persons. According to Harris, 
belonging to the human fam ily or ‘species’ does not qualify one for human rights. One 
has to be in possession o f  certain capacities or powers, namely intelligence and autonomy 
to warrant respect or protection. To sum up, Harris began by arguing for voluntary 
euthanasia on the grounds that w e respect human dignity to the extent that we respect 
personal autonomy. He clearly identified human dignity with personal autonomy. This 
argument, taken to its logical conclusions, as Harris does, also justifies involuntary 
euthanasia. Non-autonomous human beings are defined as having no human dignity, as 
non-persons, as disposable.
There are so many holes in Harris’s argument that it can’t stand up. To suggest that 
human dignity is subjective is ludicrous. “Human dignity either means the same thing for 
all human beings or it has no moral meaning at all.”77 M oreover, “it is self-contradictory 
to make an objective claim about a subject that one asserts is not objective”.78 Thirdly, i f  
human dignity is subjective, one can never ascertain when it is present and when it is not 
because it is dependent on the persons state o f  mind or m ood which is ever changing.79 
Finally, it goes against our moral instincts, whatever the cultural biases, that those who 
are incapable o f  exercising autonomy or subjectivity are without dignity e.g. the severely 
disabled, the comatose or the mentally ill.80 B y  Harris’s definition, a charming pig would  
have more dignity than som e o f  our fellow  human beings. Harris is wrong to suggest that 
human dignity is purely subjective or to suggest that those who have lost control o f  
certain functions or w ho have never had the freedom to  make choices, have no dignity.
76 Ibid., 10.
77 Daniel P. Sulmasy, ‘Death and Human Dignity’ in Linacre Quarterly, 61(1994), 27.
78 Ibid.
79 Cf. ibid., 29.
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There is an alternative basis for human dignity which does not produce such awkward 
moral conclusions namely, human beings have dignity, sim ply because they are human.81 
Dignity rests in our com m on nature, not in our individual characteristics. In short, human 
dignity is not dependent on autonomy or subjective choice.
4.3.5 Is it really about autonomy?
‘The plea “kill me: I need death but cannot kill m y se lf’, is a dubious example o f  self- 
determination.’82 Is autonom y as the central argument in the moral defence o f  
euthanasia, convincing? Far from returning control to the patient, euthanasia m edicalises 
suicide thus granting control o f  dying to m edicine and society.83 Euthanasia does not 
demedicalise death. It involves medical intervention and in fact m edicalises suicide. 
Therefore, euthanasia does not as its proponents suggest, enhance patient autonomy but 
rather turns what they propose is a private intimate m oment into a clinical event.84 This 
serves to  empower doctors not patients. I f  proponents o f  euthanasia truly favoured 
autonomy, why do they not seek to end the physicians exclusive power to prescribe 
medication?85 This would better serve their objectives, when one considers that 
euthanasia does not require skill.86 Fear o f  botched attempts at suicide is not as
80 Cf ibid.
81 Cf. Sulmasy, ‘Death and Human Dignity’, 30.
82 Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law, 42.
83 Cf. Tania Salem, ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide, Promoting Autonomy - Or Medicalizing Suicide?’ in 
Hastings Center Report, 29(1999), 30.




convincing an argument as the general public’s desire to  distance them selves from direct 
killing.87 Suicide still has a stigma. Therefore, instead o f  em powering patients, 
proponents o f  euthanasia seek to draw on the physicians ‘social and symbolic power
Gg
already conferred on medicine and medical professionals in our societies in order to 
legitimate suicide. The euthanasia debate is really about something beyond autonomy. It 
has to be when we consider that euthanasia requires the person to submit to m edical 
surveillance. This constitutes ‘an outrage to autonomy as this value is classically  
defined.’.89
Society, not the individual takes control. The m odem  project as outlined in chapter 
two, is based on control, in particular over the contingency o f  nature. Perhaps euthanasia, 
which involves death being “managed” by society, represents its best attempt to  
neutralise the threat death poses to high modernity itself, the cultural status quo. If  
euthanasia isn’t about individual autonomy, it is clearly about the contemporary loss o f  
meaning in suffering. I fear it also represents a denial o f  the human dignity o f  the 
suffering themselves. Otherwise, how could w e justify the elimination o f  suffering at the 
cost o f  the sufferers?
87 Norris, The Movement Toward Physician Assisted Suicide’, 33.
88 Salem, ‘Physician -Assisted Suicide, 33.
89 Ibid.
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4.4 ...SO M E  ARE M ORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS
If euthanasia was about empowering people, then one would expect the groups 
representing those affected to be heading the change. H owever, o f  all the groups 
representing the terminally, few  are pro-euthanasia. One is hard-pressed to find a pro­
euthanasia position among groups representing senior citizens or among all the groups 
that represent those whom on a daily basis care for those in extreme circumstances o f  
debility and illness.90 Groups representing people with disabilities have been at the 
forefront o f  opposing legalised euthanasia around the world. They were instrumental in 
turning around the Canadian senate inquiry. They don’t believe euthanasia is about 
autonomy but about human dignity, about who is considered valuable and who is 
considered disposable. The coalition o f  organisations for voluntary euthanasia has told 
them as much. ‘It has, as one o f  its commitments that legalised euthanasia should apply 
to people with disabilities even i f  they do not have a terminal illness. You do not have to  
look far to find the slippery slope.’91 Euthanasia is the solution offered to the people who 
proponents o f  euthanasia believe would be better o f f  dead. The rest o f  society is 
protected against suicide. Legally w e must not incite anyone to suicide and we certainly 
cannot assist him or her. Society puts support measures in place for such people because 
w e believe their suicidal intention is irrational. Their request for death is treated 
differently. Their autonomy is not respected because they are believed to have a 
worthwhile life. It seem s that society is quick to judge a life o f  sickness or disability as
90 Tony Burke, Executive Director of Euthanasia No! Address to the New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly, 16 October 1996.
91 Ibid.
79
worthless. The follow ing case example illustrates this point: a healthy person and a 
person with clear disability who is dependent on treatment to continue living and thus 
fulfils criteria for terminal illness both present to a physician with the same request for a 
lethal injection. They both possess the same autonomy, the same choice, and the same 
rights. Yet the physician w ill refuse the healthy person and fulfil the sick person’s 
request. His actions say to the healthy “no, you’re valuable. W e can help you through 
this” and to the disabled or sick “yes, that’s a logical choice”.92 The category currently 
en vogue at both edges o f  the spectrum o f  life, is sickness and disability. Today, 
discrimination on the grounds o f  race or religion is illegal. W e have revamped one Nazi 
category and rejected two others. Shouldn’t we reject all? Surely the same recognition  
o f  and respect for human dignity should apply equally to all human beings? Euthanasia 
is an assault on human dignity because it suggests that the patient’s life has lost all 
meaning and value.93 D isease and illness are an affront to human dignity. M edicine 
exists to serve the dignity o f  persons whose dignity is called into question by sickness. 
W hen it can cure, it should; when it can’t, it should care. ‘It is not easy to remind the 
dying o f  their dignity. But that is precisely what it means to comfort the dying.’94 I f  the 
sick, the disabled or the dying feel worthless and request death, what is the 
compassionate response? Is it to confirm their fears, which they may have imbibed from 
wider culture, or to reaffirm their dignity. This question is taken up in more detail in the 
last chapter.
92 Ibid.
93 SuJmasy, ‘Death and Human Dignity’, 31.
94 Ibid., 32.
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4.5 INAPPROPRIATE QUALITY OF LIFE JUDGEM ENTS
Contemporary attitudes to suffering best find expression in quality o f  life judgements 
used as the basis o f  choices for actions or om issions intended to bring about or hasten 
death. Their quality o f  life judgem ents base the value o f  a person’s existence on their 
quality o f  life. The value o f  the person’s life is reduced to their particular condition93. 
Typically, lives that m anifest extensive suffering or handicap are judged not worth living. 
At tim es, i f  someone dies after a long illness, w e may say it was a ‘m ercy’ because his or 
her suffering is over. But this isn’t the same as a philosophy, which asserts that the 
quality o f  a person’s life is an adequate basis for deciding to suppress his existence96. 
Because o f  our nature as spiritual beings, the meaning or value o f  our existence can never 
be known to anyone in this world. An agent may be acting from what he perceives to be 
humane or compassionate m otives when he judges som eone to be better o f f  dead. But 
none o f  us can claim to be able to judge som eone’s life not worth living. Theories which  
advocate such judgements, are particularly worrying where incompetent patients are 
concerned. Babies do not have the capacity to consent to treatment decisions, therefore 
euthanasia o f  the newborn is necessarily involuntary97. It is salutary to note the comment 
o f  one paediatric surgeon that ‘the immediate survival o f  the infant depends to a large 
extent on the attitude o f  those in attendance.’98 I f  those in attendance take the popular 
attitude that suffering is an unmitigated evil and claim to be able to judge the value o f  a 
person’s continued existence, the consequences can be drastic. There is weighty
95 Cf. Iglesias, Study guide to Euthanasia, 23.
96 Cf. Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law, 43-44.
97 Cf. ibid., 15.
98 Ibid.
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evidence to suggest that euthanasia by om ission has becom e com m on in paediatrics. 
Euthanasia i f  it was practised in the 1950’s was covert, but in recent decades it has 
becom e overt". It is often ‘a management option for children with spina bifida and those 
with D ow n’s syndrome complicated by duodenal atresia’100. This new  eth ic’ which  
imposes value-judgements on congenitally handicapped new -bom s is in danger o f  
usurping the traditional sanctity o f  life ethic. The traditional ethic maintains that a 
person’s worth or value is not reducible to  their particular condition, however damaged. 
It confines itse lf to evaluating treatment, not lives. Any assessm ent o f  treatment w ill 
involve consideration o f  how  it impinges upon the patient’s quality o f  life. However, 
decisions not to treat w ill be the result o f  a judgement that the benefits o f  a proposed 
treatment are utterly disproportionate to the burdens rather than an im possible calculation  
that a person’s continued existence is not worthwhile. The traditional position  
acknowledges that physical life is not an absolute good, which outweighs all burdens, 
required to preserve it. However, it places all decisions concerning treatment in the 
context o f  respect for the inherent dignity o f  every human life. To sum up, the traditional 
ethic focuses on ‘the advantages and disadvantages o f  specific possible treatments, given  
their effects, side effects and outcome. It does not enquire about, let alone focus upon the 
worth-whileness o f  the patient’s being alive at a ll’101. The traditional ethic, which judges 
means to preserve life, requires us to ask; is the treatment effective?’or “D o  its benefits
99 Cf. Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law, 16.
100 Iglesias, Study guide to 'Euthanasia and Clinical Practice' 27
101 Gormally, Euthanasia Clinical Practice and the Law, 44.
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outweigh its burdens?” And not as Richard M cCormick advocates ‘Granted that we can 
easily save the life, what kind o f  life are we saving?’102
Richard M cCormick argues for the use o f  judgem ents on the quality o f  patients lives 
as the basis for decisions ‘To Save or Let D ie ’ in his essay o f  the same name. He 
believes that there com es a point at which life that can be saved is not ‘meaningful 
life ’103. H e acknowledges that quality o f  life judgem ents pose a ‘frightening task’ and 
put this down to the fact that they cannot always be accounted for rationally.104 
Nevertheless, he argues for their necessity and says that i f  w e err, w e must err on the side 
o f  life. M cCormick glosses over our fear o f  such judgements. They frighten us not 
because the task is difficult (it is in fact im possible) but because it is wrong. M y  
generation likes to see itse lf as having only a future and no past, but the horror o f  the 
Nazi quality o f  life judgements on a m assive scale in 1930’s Europe is still deeply 
embedded in the Western psyche. Advanced technology allow s eugenic decisions to be 
carried out discretely within that wom b thus masking the horror. However, few  embrace 
the frankness o f  Joseph Fletcher who argues that “it is wrong, immoral and irresponsible 
-  not to back up abortion with the measures required postnatal ly to end damage in cases 
in which a child is bom  with D ow n’s syndrome105 The fact that m any em ploy a regime 
o f  calculated neglect to achieve death for ‘defective’ infants and call it ‘letting d ie’ 
indicates that we are still not com pletely comfortable with the reality o f  judging some 
people better o ff  dead. Perhaps this fear, which M cCormick believes w e ought to
102 Richard A McCormick, To Save or Let Die, Thomas A. Shannon (ed.), RevisedBioethcis (Mahwah,, 
New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1976), 164.
103 Cf.ibid., 164.
104 Ibid., 161.
105 Joseph Fletcher, ‘Abortion, Euthanasia and the Care of Defective Newborns’ in Thomas A. Shannon 
(ed.), Revised Bioethics (Mahwah,, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1976), 16, 17.
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conquer, is the natural revulsion o f  our moral instincts to a wrongful judgem ent -  the 
judgement o f  “lives not worth living.” Moreover, I find it ironic that M cCormick advises 
that w e presume in favorem vitae. The latter rule o f  thumb is supposed to protect against 
the imposition o f  our value judgements upon incompetent patients106. Yet, M cCormick 
invokes it as something to  make value judgements safer. In another discussion, 
M cCormick argues for quality o f  life judgements to determine the value o f  continued 
existence. He quotes approvingly Judson G Randolf, a ch ief surgeon in ‘Children’s ’ 
Hospital M edical Centre, Washington, D .C  as follows:
If a severely handicapped child were suddenly given one m oment o f  
om niscience and total awareness o f  his or her outlook for the future, 
would that child necessarily opt for life? N o  one has yet been able to 
demonstrate that the answer would always be ‘yes’.107
This is an innovative way o f  imposing value judgements on a handicapped child from the 
entirely inappropriate perspective o f  normal adult experience. A  normal healthy adult 
having known and lived all the benefits o f  health would naturally be appalled by the 
prospect o f  a life o f  severe handicap108. Yet, people with a disability from birth can 
oftentimes take it largely for granted having never experienced life without disability. 
The fact is, severely handicapped children don’t get such moments o f  illumination as 
M cCormick refers to, nor would i f  be to their advantage i f  they did. This hypothetical 
argument is not only irrelevant but dangerous because it gives us a vehicle to judge the
106 John Finnis, ‘A philosophical case against Euthanasia’ ,212-213.
107 Richard A McCormick, How Brave A New World? Dilemmas in Bioethics. (London: SCM Press, 1981), 
400.
108 Iglesias, Study guide to Euthanasia, 103.
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quality o f  a persons life from our own cosy standards while putting that judgem ent in the 
child’s mouth so as to appear more reasonable and humane.
What is commonly referred to as the John Hopkins case brought the practice o f  
euthanasia by om ission in relation to defective new-borns into the open. The case 
occurred in 1963 in the John Hopkins University Hospital but was not publicised until 
later109. Since then it has been the subject o f  much discussion. A  baby bom  with D ow n ’s 
syndrome was denied an operation to remove an intestinal blockage. The operation was 
minor, similar in scale to an appendectomy110. The baby could not be fed until the 
blockage was removed because to do so would kill the baby. The parents refused consent 
for the surgery and the hospital sought no court order to protect the baby’s life111. The 
baby starved to death after fifteen days.
The benefits o f  the treatment clearly outweighed the minor burden o f  relatively easy  
and low  risk surgery. Without the operation it was clear that the patient would die. A  
normal child would have been given the operation and no competent patient would have 
refused it for them selves112. The surgery was denied precisely because it would have 
preserved life, - a life judged not worth preserving113. M cCormick believes that this 
quality o f  life judgement was incorrect because it didn’t consider or else misjudged the 
child’s capacity for relationship. He believes we need clearer criteria for making quality 
o f  life judgements. He still insists on their necessity but says w e need to decide where to  
draw the line based on relational capacity.114 He doesn’t face up to the fact that it was a
109 G. Grisez and J. M. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice. A Contribution to the Euthanasia 
Debate, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 16.
110 Gormally, Euthanasia Ctinical Practice and the Law, 45.
111 Grisez and Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice, 16.
112 Ibid., 272.
113 Ibid.
114 Cf. McCormick, ‘To Save of Let Die’, 164.
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quality o f  life judgement that killed the child at the centre o f  the ‘John Hopkins case’. 
The ordinary/extraordinary means approach could never have allow ed it. It is quality o f  
life language and the values it upholds, namely judging som e lives not worth preserving, 
which incites such injustice. Are M cCormick’s quality o f  life judgem ents, based on  
relational capacity, any better? For a human being to lose a capacity, even one w e prize 
as highly as ‘relational capacity’, is to lose a quality. It is not however, to lose on e’s life, 
the value o f  one’s existence or on e’s dignity.115 In his book ‘Corrective V ision’ 
M cCormick argues against positive eugenics because ‘W e can begin to value the person 
in terms o f  the quality. In other words we reduce the whole to a part.’116 Yet, isn ’t this 
precisely what M cCormick advocates in ‘To Save or Let D ie?” In corrective vision he 
says, ‘people who do that are on their way to doing other things civilised  societies should 
abhor.117’ I agree and I believe that euthanasia o f  newborn babies is a prime example o f  
this. It fulfils postnatally what only Fletcher w ill publically advocate,, namely the 
widespread eugenic programme carried out in contemporary culture in utero and 
sanctioned by leaders such as Tony Blair who allows for restrictions on killing healthy 
babies in the wom b but supports the abortion o f  disabled babies up to birth. That is the 
clearest revelation o f  all about how  w e chose to deal with the sick in our society.
M cCormick makes the assertion that quality o f  life judgem ents are just a clarification 
on the traditional sanctity o f  life ethic. He argues that it is the quality o f  life after 
treatment that establishes the treatment as extraordinary. This isn ’t true. It is the 
relationship between the burdens o f  treatment and its proposed benefits, including those
115 Gormally, Euthanasia Clinical Practice and the Law, 45.
116 McCormick, Corrective Vision, 168.
117 Idem, ‘To Save or Let Die' 168.
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to quality o f  life, which establishes the treatment as ordinary or extraordinary.
In M cCormick’s ethic, the treatment is irrelevant because he has decided in advance the 
categories o f  life worth saving and worth what he calls ie ttin g  d ie’. (M cCormick  
believes that quality o f  life judgem ents should be made on the basis o f  relational capacity 
associated with certain medical conditions.)118 Quality o f  life  judgem ents are made in  
isolation from treatment considerations and are the final truth o f  the decision to treat or 
not to treat.
Once again M cCormick claims to have common ground with the traditional ethic 
when he agrees that all lives are o f  incalculable value. H owever, he argues that in a 
certain condition such lives have ‘reached their potential’119 This is a euphemism for  
“they’re better o ff  dead.” Such a calculation is an assault on their human dignity and at 
variance with his claim to recognise the incalculable value o f  every human life.
M cCormick asserts that life should only be preserved as the basis o f  other values.120 
He believes that the Judaeo-Christian tradition supports his claim. He says that i f  w e  
unpack the implications o f  the limits on the duty to prolong life  in the Christian tradition 
this becom es clear. It is true that the Christian tradition does not see life as an absolute 
good. It can be an affirmation o f  human dignity to sacrifice on e’s life for a higher value 
or to forgo expensive m edical treatment in order to spare one’s family financial ruin. 
There are other examples mentioned in an earlier section, but none o f  them involve  
judging a life not worth living. The traditional ethic recognises the intrinsic value o f  the




human person as a being destined for good. Nothing can destroy the dignity o f  being  
made in the image o f  God. Life is not sim ply a bonum utile.
Life is not only a condition which is necessary i f  a person is 
to achieve higher values. It is an intrinsic aspect o f  human 
flourishing; it directly contributes to the full dignity o f  the 
human person. H ence although human life is not absolute or 
superior to all other personal goods, neither is it 
instrumental’.121
This leads us on to our next question, namely the dualistic interpretation o f  
human nature, at work in relation to patients who are severely brain injured.
4.6 A  DUALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF HUM AN NATURE
The medicalisation o f  suffering effected our self-conception as human beings as outlined 
in chapter three. ‘Deconstructing mortality’ led to the body being divided up into 
component parts to be fixed. The body came to be seen as vehicle or place which was 
inhabited by the human person. Our response to patients in what is commonly termed 
persistent vegetative state (P.Y .S.) reflects a dualistic interpretation o f  human nature. 
The treatment o f  these patients is a much disputed question in the euthanasia debate. It is 
a com plex debate at the centre o f  which is the question o f  the artificial delivery o f  
nutrition and hydration (ADNH). Som e ethicists argue that it constitute m edical 
treatment and may be withdrawn under the benefit versus burden test. Others maintain 
that it is part o f  normal or ‘comfort care’ and that its withdrawal amounts to euthanasia 
by omission.
121 Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical practice and the Law, 379, 380.
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The main argument against A D N H  as m edical treatment is the sim ple fact that food  
and water are the basic necessities for life. ‘Unlike medical treatment, all people require 
them whether they are well or ill’122. The provision o f  food and water is part o f  normal 
or comfort care afforded to all patients, like protection from exposure, or hygienic care. 
A few  inches o f  plastic tubing do not m agically transform food into m edicine.123 
‘Nourishment and hydration are not in them selves m edicines or treatments for any 
malady except their lack’124. It can be argued that the withdrawal o f  A D N H  from  
patients in PVS constitutes aiming at their deaths. If one removes a respiration there is a 
possibility that the patient w ill begin to breathe spontaneously e.g. Karen Quinlan. 
Unlike air, we can’t just start drawing in food. This leads som e to say that the removal o f  
food is tantamount to sucking the air out o f  the room .125
On the other hand, plastic tubing may not transform food into m edicine, but plastic
tubing itse lf is a treatment for a loss o f  function, namely the inability to digest food.
— * 1 
Food is a universal need, but plastic tubing is not.
Whatever one’s position on the status o f  ADNH , the decision to suppress the existence
o f  certain human beings on the grounds that it is merely biological, em ploys dualistic
reasoning. AD NH  is seen as useless and best removed because it treats a mere body, the
real person having long since departed. This v iew  fails to realise that ‘the human being’s
122 Robert Barry, ‘Feeding the Comatose’ in The Thomist, 53(1989), 30.
123 Cf. Stephen J. Heaney ‘You Can’t Be Any Poorer Than Dead’ : Difficulties in Recognizing Artificial 
Nutrition and Hydration as Medical Treatment’, in Linacre Quarterly, 61 (1994) 79.
124 Ibid., 82.
125 Cf. Ibid., 85.
126 Cf. Ibid., 83.
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life is not a vegetable life supplemented by an animal life, supplemented by an 
intellectual life; it is the one life o f  a unitary being.’127
Human bodily life is the life o f  a person until that person dies. Death occurs when an 
organism ‘ceases to function as a specific unified hom eostatic system  and becom es 
disorganised into a mere collection o f  heterogeneous substances’128. Once the unifying 
life principle is present, so is the human person, no matter how  damaged. Advocates o f  
feeding patients in P.V.S. see this as caring for the em bodied person. P.V.S. is a severe 
brain injury not a fateful disease.129 Yet it seem s that society would be a lot happier i f  
such patients would just die. W e seem  to be particularly troubled by the ‘biological 
tenacity’130o f  the ‘cognitively com prom ised.’131Are w e projecting our fear on to patients 
in P.V.S:
Does the fact that they are cognitively comprom ised confront us with our deepest 
fears o f  our own fragile purchase upon the control that accrues to the cognitively  
powerful? Because we find their wounded plight troubling, have w e explored  
sufficiently the reasons why w e are troubled by their “biological tenacity?” Have 
we probed sufficiently our own fears o f  mortality, and our ow n discomfort in 
living with those who most acutely manifest our frail humanity?132
Christians reject death o f  the neo-cortex as a definition for death. “M y identity is the 
identify o f  the whole organism, even i f  the higher functions o f  personhood are seated in 
the brain. H ow  else could a man love a human and not merely her brains?”133 The 
dignity o f  the human person, as an ensouled body, must be respected unto death as
127 Finnis, ‘A philosophical case against Euthanasia’, 31.
128 Ashley and O’ Rourke, Health Care Ethics, 400.
129 Jeremiah J. McCarthy ‘Caring for the critically 111 Patient in a Persistent Vegetative State: Must 
Nutrition and Hydration Support Always be Provided?’ in Lirncre Quarterly, 61(1994), 67.
130 McCarthy ‘Caring for the Critically 111 Patient... ’ 63. Quoting a phrase used by Daniel Callahan in his 
essay ‘On Feeding the Dying, Hastings Center Report, 13(1983), 22.
131 Ibid., 73.
132 Ibid.
133 Grisez and Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice , 71. (F .Robert Veatch’s Analysis.)
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defined earlier. Patients in P.V.S are still persons because they belong to the human 
family, not the animal kingdom. That kind to which they belong is characterised by 
rational nature134. Attacks on their humanity and personhood constitute and attempt to 
deprive them o f  their rights as human persons. W e should stop using dehumanising 
language when referring to brain injured patients. Human beings cannot be in a 
‘vegetative’ state. Humans, animals and plants all share certain functions. But biological 
life is specifically different in each o f  these species. That is not a speculative statement 
but a matter o f  fact which, even minimal knowledge o f  b iology confirm s.135 Each o f  
these species, while performing similar functions, perform them in a way proper to 
themselves. W e perform our so-called vegetative functions i.e. assimilate food, grow, 
reproduce etc., in a human way, not in an animal or plant way. ‘To be able to do som e o f  
the things a plant can do is not to be a plant; to be partly perfected by activities common  
to animals and plants is not to be partly a plant.’136 Perhaps we should refer to the 
patients we are currently discussing as being in a persistent non-responsive state. At 
least this way we do not pre-empt the debate on the provision or withdrawal o f  A D N H  by 
dehumanising the patients in question.
In the highly publicised case o f  Tony Bland, the Law Lords decision to  approve the 
withdrawal o f  tube-feeling was based on a ‘medical judgement that tube-feeding had 
becom e futile because continued existence in Tony Bland’s condition was not a benefit; 
in other words, Tony Bland’s existence was without worth or value.’137 For starters, none 
o f  us created Tony Bland and us mere mortals are incapable o f  calculating his value.
134 Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical practice and the Law, 41.
135 Cf. Grisez and Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice, 373
136 Ibid.
137 Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law, 143.
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Secondly, if this judgement is accepted as a practical judgement for making life and death 
decisions, how would it be limited so as not to justify killing any patient whose life was 
full of pain and misery? Thirdly, the emphasis on patient autonomy in bioethics was a 
response to medical paternalism. In Bland, we have an example of court approved 
medical paternalism whereby a group of citizens, doctors, are deciding whether certain 
patients live or die based on their opinion that they represent lives not worth living. This 
is even more unjust than the medical paternalism which went before because ‘“their 
medical qualifications, experience ant ethos confer no standing to settle for the whole 
community such issues of meaning, consistency, humanity and justice.”’138
It is not doctors alone, but all members of society that must debate and agree a shared 
set of values. I don’t believe that we, as a society, should accept the kind of 
discrimination against the sick and the disabled based on an absolute rejection of 
suffering. Nor should we accept killing as a solution to any social problem. In order to 
counter this culture of death, value must be restored to the sick and the dying, and 
meaning restored to suffering. I believe that only the Christian vision of the dignity of 
every human being, the Christian concept of mercy and the Christian meaning of human 
suffering is capable of bringing about this change in attitudes.
138 John Finnis, Bland: C r o s s i n g  th e  R u b i c o n ? ,  (1993), 109, as reported by Dieter Giesen ‘Dilemmas at 
life’s end: a comparative legal perspective’ in John Keown f e d . ) ,  E u t h a n a s i a  E x a m i n e d .  E t h i c a l ,  C l i n i c a l  
a n d  L e g a l  P e r s p e c t i v e s  (Cambridge, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1995), 210.
C hapter 5: A Christian Response
93
5.1 MEDICINE, CHRISTIANITY AND COMPASSION
Medicine and the Church have a centuries old history.1 Western medical tradition has its 
roots in early Christianity and classical Greek civilisation2 The latter furnished the 
tradition with the two vital components of rational medicine and ethics, but only 
Christianity was capable of providing compassion.3 It was a Christian concern for the 
sick that gave rise to the first hospitals.4 Christians organised themselves to care for the 
sick. They were following the example of Christ. One third of Mark’s Gospel is taken 
up with telling of how Jesus cured the sick. In Luke’s Gospel, Jesus commands his 
apostles to do two things, namely to heal and to teach. The Church recognised that God 
usually works mediately, through secondary causes in the world, rather than through 
miracles, therefore it promoted care of the sick through medicine.5 In the West, medical 
charity was shaped by the Christian understanding of the intrinsic, and equal value, of all 
human beings.
Today, we take compassion largely for granted, viewing it as an instinctive reaction to 
human suffering. However, like all ideas, it grew up at a particular time and place in 
history. Compassion for the sick was based on the doctrine of imago dei which held that 
all human beings were made in the image and likeness of God and therefore have equal 
dignity. It is argued that the Greeks did not have an ideological basis for valuing the
1 Cf. Russell E. Smith, ‘Medical Ethics: An Offspring of the Church’ in Dolentium Hominum 15 (1990),
39.
2 Cf Gary B. Ferngren, ‘Medicine and compassion in early Christianity’ in Theology Digest 26/4 (1999) 
315.
3 Cf. ibid.
4 Smith, ‘Medical Ethics: An Offspring of the Church’, 40.
5 Ibid.
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equal dignity of all human beings.6 This is because the Greeks did not believe that 
emotion was a desirable basis for action. They valued reason alone.7 Therefore, they did 
not have an ideological basis for providing personal charity let alone corporate charity. 
Unlike the God of Christianity, the pagan gods were thought to favour the powerful 
rather than the poor. Greeks directed general beneficence at all citizens but they didn’t 
have a preferential option for the marginalised. Early Christianity was changing the 
world, according to the esteemed historian Henry Sigerist, who said that Christianity
introduced ‘the most revolutionary and decisive change in the attitude of society toward
• • 8 the sick.’ The sick person’s position in society was utterly elevated.
Christian ministry to the sick started out small and mushroomed. The Christian 
organised care of the sick was very extensive in the cities. Alms were collected and 
distributed to the poor. Care of the sick, at the outset, involved simple nursing rather than 
therapeutic medicine.9
The plague, which broke out in 251A.D, gave the Christian initiative added impetus. 
The civic authorities had no programme for the treatment of the sick and simply made 
supplications to the gods. Christians, who were being persecuted at the time, used their 
existing network to care for the sick and even branched out by caring for their 
persecutors.10 The death toll was high among the cared for and the carers alike. The 
bishop of Alexandria lost his best brother to the plague. The plague, while devastating,
6 Cf. Ferngren, ‘Medicine and compassion in early Christianity’, 317.
7 Cf. ibid., 316.




saw the church extend its ministry of care to the sick who were not members of the 
Christian community. This marked a new departure in which there was no distinction 
made between strangers and Christians when caring for the sick. Christian persecution 
abated in 312A.D. with the conversion of the emperor Constantine to Christianity. The 
Church received large donations, which it channelled into the establishment of permanent 
hospitals. These were staffed by monastic orders. They began in the East around 350 
A.D. and spread to the West around the end of the fourth century. They focused on 
alleviating human suffering of the poor and the indigent.11 Rational or secular medicine
19had developed in Greek civilisation around the time of Hippocrates, in the fifth century. 
The Hippocratic oath, which requires physicians to ‘do no harm,’ persisted into modem 
society. However, it has either been altered or ignored by physicians in countries or 
states where abortion and euthanasia are legal. The Christian virtue of compassion 
permeated through wider society and supplemented the Hippocratic tradition. But it too 
has been diluted. ‘It is difficult to maintain a balanced relationship between the practice 
of scientific medicine and the duty to provide compassionate care.’13 But compassion 
demands that the health care professional treat the patient not merely in a professional 
and medically competent manner but lovingly and tenderly as a human being of infinite 
worth and dignity. There is a danger, as outlined in the previous chapter, of treating 
diseases instead of persons. The increased use of technology is in part responsible for a 
shift away from a ministry of mercy in modem healthcare.
11 Cf. ibid., 320
12 Cf. ibid., 321.
13 Ibid., 323.
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Care has become all about doing rather than being. Do health care professionals actually 
have the time to be present to their patients anymore, short of a brief clinical 
consultation? Modem medicine is lacking a human face.14 Today the Catholic Church is 
the single largest health care provider in the world. However, the religious sister, the 
traditional image of health care, is long since gone, due to a decline in vocations to 
religious life. Many argue that it doesn’t matter if it’s not a nun who takes your blood 
pressure as long as Christian values are upheld in the hospital. Upholding the ethos of a 
Catholic hospital of course means that immoral procedures such as abortion and 
euthanasia cannot take place on the premises but also that the experience of being a 
patient in a Catholic hospital be concretely different from that of a community hospital. 
‘To encounter a Catholic health facility must be an encounter with the healing touch of 
our Master, who said “What you do to the least of My own, that you do to me.’”15 They 
must realise that ‘nobody, however sick, is beyond our compassion.’16 They must 
experience that there are no limits to Christian compassion. This current secular age is 
hostile to any but private manifestations of Christianity.17 We have witnessed in this 
century the removal of religious values from most public institutions, including those 
hospitals that have religious origins. I8What medicine offers today grows from the values 
that the secular world encourages, such as medical research. This must not be
14 Cf. Smith, ‘Medical Ethics: An Offspring of the Church’, 40, 45.
15 Ibid., 46.
16 Ibid.
17 Cf. Femgren, ‘Medicine and compassion in early Christianity’, 323.
18 Ibid.
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depreciated as it has provided us with our understanding of disease and its cure. 
Unfortunately, a by-product of secularisation has been to cut medicine off from its 
Christian roots and the well-spring of compassion.’ The spirit of secularism whatever 
else may be credited to it, does not naturally foster compassion.’19 The contemporary 
drive towards euthanasia reflects this. You cannot take care of someone by killing them. 
True compassion supports and sustains the sufferer. It doesn’t make the judgement that 
he or she isn’t worth preserving. ‘Compassion is the missing element in modem 
medicine. ,2° Perhaps this is because it is not a quality that can be summoned at will. It 
has to be fostered. It is easy to recognise the dignity and humanity of every patient and 
treat them compassionately if you see them as someone bearing the image of God. 
However, without this transcendental basis to nourish compassion, it is likely to wither 
and die like seeds on rocky ground.21 It is clear that ‘the Christian ideals, which 
nourished the roots of medicine all those centuries ago, need to be reawakened in modem 
medicine.’
5.2 WHAT IT MEANS TO SHOW MERCY
‘The word and the concept of “mercy” seems to cause uneasiness in man, who thanks to 
the enormous development of science and technology, never before known in history, has 




22 Pope John Paul II. Encyclical Letter Dives in Misericordia, 30 November 1980. 1.2 . Hereafter, DM and 
cited in the body of the text.
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does not feel it needs a merciful God, not being completely at the mercy of the forces of 
nature. Moreover, the contemporary mindset ‘ tends to exclude from life and to remove 
from the human heart the very idea of mercy.’ (DM. 1.2.) The previous section outlined 
how medicine no longer seems to be a ministry of mercy. With this in mind it is salutary 
to note that the only popular use of the word ‘mercy’ today, in this secular age, is in 
relation to euthanasia. The latter is commonly refereed to as mercy-killing. It is deemed 
merciful to put a human being out of their suffering by lethal injection. This 
understanding of mercy is very different to the Christian understanding of mercy. The 
latter is laid out in the encyclical letter of Pope John Paul II on the Mercy of God, Dives 
in Misericordia.
God’s chosen people had a special experience of the mercy of God. Israel was in 
Covenant with God and broke that covenant many times. The prophets preached 
repentance and in their preaching linked mercy with God’s love. Mercy signifies a 
special power of love, which is stronger than the sin and infidelity of the chosen people. 
(DM. III.4.)
Job, the subject of innocent suffering, after his rebellion, turned to God. The chosen 
people when in slavery turned to God and he delivered them from their oppressors. ‘This 
is precisely the grounds upon which the people and each of its members based their 
certainty of the mercy of God, which can be invoked whenever tragedy strikes. ’ (DM. 
III. 4.) Despite the idolatry of his people in the desert, God declares to Moses that he was 
a ‘God merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and 
faithfulness.’ (DM III.4.) This is why the psalmists sing of the God of love, tenderness,
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mercy and fidelity. God is faithful to his own, but also to Himself, for he declared 
himself to be a God of mercy.
Mercy is the content of God’s relationship with his people. It marks their life of 
intimacy with Him. In the Old Testament, the Creator has already linked himself to his 
creature with a particular love. God cannot despise anything that He has made. The 
mountains may fall but the love of the Lord will stand. (DM. III.4.)
Christ personifies the whole of the Old Testament’s tradition about God’s mercy. 
(DM. 1.2.) Christ revealed the Father’s mercy and in particular, his closeness to man 
when man is suffering, under threat at the very heart of his existence and dignity. (DM. 
1.2.) According to Luke’s Gospel, Christ’s first messianic declaration echoes the words 
of the prophet Isaiah : ‘The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to 
preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and 
recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the 
acceptable year of the Lord.” (Lk 4:18-19.) God is a sign of love for broken people. 
(DM. II.3.) Jesus revealed that a love addressed to man is present in our world. It is a 
love that embraces everything in the human condition and is particularly present to the 
suffering, the poor or victims of injustice. This is God’s mercy.
The parable of the Prodigal Son powerfully portrays God’s mercy. The Son 
demanded his inheritance and proceeded to squander it ‘in loose living’ in a foreign land. 
(DM. IV.5.) A famine arose in that country and he was starving. He envied the pigs their 
pods but was denied even that. He decided that he would return to his father and ask to 
be treated as one of his servants because they had bread to spare. But the son is aware 
that he has lost the dignity of sonship. Under the norms of justice he no longer deserves
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the rights of a son. However, the Father goes beyond the norms of justice and extends to 
his son merciful love. He restores his dignity as Son and the dignity of his humanity. 
“He had compassion, ran to meet him, threw his arms around his neck and kissed him.” 
(DM. IV.6.) This parable tells us that God’s love, like the Father’s love in the parable, is 
able to reach down to every person no matter how miserable their state. ‘When this 
happens, the person who is the object of mercy does not feel humiliated, but rather found 
again and restored to value.’ (DM. IV.5.) Merciful love is by its essence a creative love. 
(DM. VII. 14.) As already pointed out, it restores value. This point is also brought out in 
the parable of the Good Samaritan. On the outside it may appear that mercy belittles the 
recipient because the relationship seems unequal between giver and receiver. However, 
the relationship of mercy is based, as this parable illustrates, on the common experience 
of the dignity of the human person. Moreover, the relationship between giver and 
receiver is reciprocal because in reality the one who gives also receives. This is the 
testimony of many people who care for the sick. This point is brought out further in the 
next section, which deals with the meaning of human suffering. Lest there be any doubt 
about this, we only have to look at the Cross of Christ. (DM. VIII. 15.) It is the most 
complete revelation of God’s mercy, his selfless love for humankind. Yet the Father calls 
us to have mercy on his crucified Son who knocks at the door of every human heart. 
(DM. V.8.) The cross also demonstrates the creative nature of mercy because through it 
we are welcomed into God’s family, the Trinity. (DM. V.7.) Mercy is the kind of love 
that does not allow itself to be ‘conquered by evil’, but overcomes ‘evil with good.’ 
(DM. IV.6.) Christ testified to this by his death and resurrection whereby he conquered 
sin and death. The Father, in his mercy for sinful humankind, does not recoil before the
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extraordinary sacrifice of the Son. (DM. V.7.) The Son is in many ways mercy incarnate
(DM. 1.2) for despite fear expressed in the Garden of Gethsemane, he accepts the
poisoned chalice. The actions of Father and Son alike teach us that:
The true and proper meaning of mercy does not consist only in looking, 
however penetratingly and compassionately, at moral, physical or material 
evil: mercy is manifested in its true and proper aspect when it restores to 
value, promotes and draws good from all the forms o f evil existing in the 
world and in man. (DM. IV.6.)
5.3 MEANING OF SUFFERING IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
‘It is the experience of Israel that illness is mysteriously linked to sin and evil, and that 
faithfulness to God according to his law restores life: “For I am the Lord, your 
healer.”23(E x  15:26.) However, Israel falsely identified all human suffering as a 
punishment for concrete sins. Proverbs, Tobit and Sirach all upheld the Deuteronomist’s 
thesis of divine retribution. Good is rewarded in this life and evil punished, for there is 
no reward or punishment beyond the grave. Therefore, suffering, or misery, are due to 
unfaithfulness to Yahweh.24 Proverbs, the purpose of which was to instruct the people in 
wisdom, saw suffering as a corrective i.e. God’s way of disciplining sinful humanity and 
a sign of his love. 25 Any exceptions to the rule, such as cases of undeserved suffering, 
are merely ignored. The Book of Tobit doesn’t debate the question of innocent suffering 
at all, despite the fact of the undeserved suffering of Tobit
23 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1502. Hereafter, C.C.C. and cited in the body of the text.
24 Cf. R.A Dyson, rev. by J. McShane, ‘Proverbs’ in A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture 
(Nairobi: Nelson, 1975), 41 Ig.
25 Cf. Dyson, rev. by J. McShane, ‘Proverbs’ in New Catholic Commentary on Scripture, 412h.
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and Sarah and the fact that this was a burning question in Jewish minds in the last 
centuries before Christ.26. The book of Tobit instead sets out the ‘good’ attitude to 
suffering and encourages the reader to have faith in Divine Providence, for virtue will be 
rewarded in the end. The book of Tobit is an exhortation to faith and patience.
The challenge to the theory of divine retribution comes from within the wisdom 
tradition itself in the form of Qoheleth and Job.27 ‘Qoheleth found the theory of divine 
retribution wanting because even if God did give the good person all the blessings of life, 
the key to happiness was not to be found among them.’28 Qoheleth was disillusioned 
with life because death ends all life’s pleasures and therefore spoils all enjoyment.
Job was a righteous man and, as the theory of divine retribution would suggest, 
rewarded accordingly29. God blessed him with a happy family and great wealth. Then 
tragedy struck his world. He lost his wealth, his children died and he became ill. His 
friends try to convince him that he must have overlooked some sin he committed and 
must confess it to God. But Job passionately protests: I clothed myself in righteousness, 
it was my clothing, in justice as a robe and turban. (Job 28:14.)30 The whole point of the 
story is that Job suffers despite the fact that he committed no secret sin. ‘In the course of 
his arguments, Job appeals again and again to the divine tribunal. He seems to feel that 
the hardest thing of all to take is the silence of God in the midst of his suffering.’31 
However, ‘In the end, God himself reproves Job’s friends for their accusations and 
recognises that Job is not guilty. His suffering is the suffering of someone who is
26 Cf P. Giffin, ‘Tobit’ in New Catholic Commentary on Scripture, 339g.






innocent and it must be accepted as a mystery, which the individual is unable to penetrate 
completely by his own intelligence.,32(SD. III. 11.)
The old thinking denied the depth of the mysteries of death and suffering and the 
silence of God33. Job was revolutionary in that for the first time the question of suffering 
was directed at God instead of man. Job was not personally in the wrong but neither was 
God. The connection between sin and suffering is real but can only be understood within 
the context of original sin. Here the term ‘sin’ is used as an analogy because it is 
contracted not committed. It refers to our inheritance of a fallen human nature.
Suffering and death entered the world through our forefathers. (CCC. 400.) ‘ God 
created man in his image and established a relationship of friendship with Him but 
Man rebelled. The symbol of the tree of knowledge represents the limits appropriate to 
humans. The eating of the forbidden fruit of the tree symbolically evokes man’s first sin, 
namely disobedience and claiming for himself what properly belongs to God. (CCC. 
398.) This destroys original justice and creates disharmony in creation. Suffering and 
death enter the world.
During the Babylonian Exile, Second Isaiah saw in the miserable reality of the Israelites 
not a sign of Yahweh’s failure, but of their own failure and of God’s power. He saw it as 
God’s way of purifying the people. In suffering, Israel would learn to truly serve the 
Lord.34 Isaiah reveals that suffering can be an occasion for fidelity to God and an
32 Pope John Paul II. Apostolic Letter Salvifici Doloris, 11 February 1984. II.3. Hereafter, SD and cited
within the body of the text.
33 Cf. Reilly, A Tale o f Two Testaments, 69.
34 A. Penna, ‘Isaiah’ in New Catholic Commentary on Scripture, 66b.
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opportunity for conversion. The positive value of suffering underlies his message of 
hope. Isaiah prophesies the time when God will pardon every offence and heal every 
illness. (C.C.C. 1502, Is. 33:24.) There is a major breakthrough in the problem of 
innocent suffering, which had painfully preoccupied Israel for many years in the fourth 
song of The Servant of Yahweh. (Second Isaiah: 52:13, 53:12.) It stresses suffering yet 
the tone is triumphant. (Is.52:15.) It has a strong theological message.
The servant is chosen by God for the mission of establishing justice on earth, 
not only for Israel but for the world. He performs this task with humility and 
gentleness, but in spite of this he meets with neglect and opposition which 
develops into persecution. This is a situation familiar throughout Israel’s 
history, in the experience of the prophets particularly. But the final song 
provides a dramatic and unexpected climax: the result of the Servant’s 
suffeings is not failure but success, and success not in spite of but precisely 
through his sufferings.” [Author’s emphasis] 35
The prophets did not suffer for their own sins but the sins of Israel. Therefore, suffering 
is not necessarily a sign of guilt but of attonement.36. Christ who bears the burden of the 
sins of humanity is the ultimate witness to innocent suffering.
35 Ibid., 481a.
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Suffering and sickness are among the gravest problems confronted in human life. (CCC. 
1500.) In an earlier section we mentioned that all sickness is an intimation of death. It is 
frightening also in that it makes us feel powerless and subject to forces that we cannot 
control. For these reasons, ‘illness can lead to anguish, self-absorption, sometimes even 
despair or revolt against God.’ (CCC 1501.) ‘For, whereas the existence of the world 
opens as it were the eyes of the human soul to the existence of God, to His wisdom, 
power and greatness, evil and suffering seem to obscure this image, sometimes in a 
radical way’. (SD. III.9.) In chapter three we outlined that modem medicine aims to 
return us to the world status quo ante. However, that for many people who have been 
sick is impossible as a moral choice. Perhaps this is because illness ‘can also make a 
person more mature, helping him discern in his life what is essential so that we can turn 
toward that which is. Very often illness provokes a search for God and a return to him. ’ 
(CCC. 1501.) This possibility for suffering leading to enrichment in our lives may be 
what the Arabs are getting at when they say “All sunshine makes a desert.” Despite the 
fact that suffering may be an occasion for becoming, in itself it is not good. To suffer is 
to experience evil. (SD. 2.7.) God came that we may have life and have it abundantly 
(John 10:10).
That Gospel does not call suffering a welcome thing in and of itself.
But recognises that only through suffering accepted in love, do 
we truly come to grips with the real meaning and seriousness of life.37
5.4 THE CHRISTIAN MEANING OF HUMAN SUFFERING
36 Ibid., 481a.
37 Raising the Stakes in the Euthanasia Debate, Origins 24(1994), 19
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Suffering seems to be an exclusively human phenomenon. It is rooted in our nature as 
human being with an eternal destiny. (SD. II.3.) It belongs to our transcendence, is a 
mystery, and as such reveals the depth, which is proper to human beings. (SD. 1.3.) 
Suffering is thus more complex a reality than sickness or pain. (SV. II.5.) Physical 
suffering constitutes the pain we feel when the body is injured of diseased, whereas moral 
suffering involves “pain of the soul.” (SD. II.5.) Suffering can have a spiritual as well as 
a psychological nature, a reality that is often neglected in modem medicine, as outlined 
earlier. Sometimes we treat the loneliness of the dying with prozac or lethal injection.
The Old Testament is a powerful model for a holistic approach to the human person 
because it often links ‘“moral” sufferings with the pain of specific parts of the body.’ 
(SD. II.7.) In the previous chapter we saw how a mind/body dualism encouraged by 
specialisation in medicine led to failure to recognise the dignity of brain-injured patients. 
“It is obvious that pain, especially physical pain, is widespread in the animal world. But 
only the suffering human being knows that he is suffering and wonders why; and he 
suffers in a humanly speaking still deeper way if he does not find a satisfactory answer.” 
(SD. III.9.) This was evidenced in Job’s case when the thing he found hardest to take 
about his miserable situation was God’s silence. God’s response to the ‘Why’ of human 
suffering is the Cross of Christ. (SD. 111.13.)
5.4.1 W h at is suffering?
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5.4.2 SUFFERING CONQUERED BY LOVE.
‘For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him 
should not perish but have eternal life.’(Jn. 3:16, SD. IV. 14.) Although this thesis is 
about suffering in its temporal form, Jesus came to save us from definitive suffering 
namely sin and death. (SD. IV.4.) But when Christ conquers eschatological suffering he 
also, at least indirectly, strikes at suffering in its temporal dimension because, as outlined 
earlier, suffering is linked to original sin. Christ conquered sin and death by his death 
and resurrection but does not blot out human suffering from our experience or the world. 
Nevertheless, the light of salvation sheds light on temporal suffering. The fact that God 
gave his only Son that we might be saved radically changes our situation in the world. 
God’s love for us is so great that he draws near to us in our suffering. Firstly, in the 
Incarnation Christ takes on our human condition. He lived among us healing the sick and 
consoling the afflicted. (SD. IV. 16.) ‘He was sensitive to every human suffering whether 
of body or soul.’ (SD. IV. 16.) But ultimately Christ drew close to us in our suffering by 
taking this suffering upon himself. While living among us he grew weary, he felt 
misunderstood even by his closed friends, he experienced animosity toward him, he was 
aware of plans to put him to death. Christ was aware of the suffering he would go 
through, in the Garden of Gethsemane, and he shuddered before it. (SD. IV. 18.) He was 
arrested, humiliated, mocked and crucified. (SD. IV. 17.) Finally, he cries out in 
abandonment on the cross. The cry of forsakenness is paradoxical because it at once 
reveals the similarity and the difference between Christ’s suffering and ours. Christ’s 
sense of abandonment can only be understood within the context of the unique filial
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relationship between Jesus and the Father. But whereas we could not experience the 
intensity of Christ’s pain at being abandoned by the Father, ‘there exists no pain, no 
darkness, no loneliness...no horror, no abandonment, no cry...nothing at all that is not 
found in him who has not refused anything of the misery he finds in us. ’ Through 
Christ’s perfect love for the Father and the Father’s perfect love for sinful humankind not 
only have we been redeemed but so has human suffering. (SD. V. 19.) It has been linked 
to that perfect divine love revealed on the Cross., ‘to that love which creates good, 
drawing it out by meaning of suffering,’ to a saving love. (SD. IV. 18.)
5.4.3 Sharers in the Suffering of Christ.
Everyone who suffers can participate in Christ’s redemptive suffering and “complete 
what is lacking in Christ’s affliction.” (Col 1:24.) This is because “ in bringing about the 
redemption through suffering, Christ has also raised human suffering to the level of the 
redemption.” (SD. V.19.) This does not mean that Christ has not accomplished the 
Redemption. The Redemption of the world has already been accomplished through 
Christ’s suffering. However, Christ did not bring it to a close. It lives on through every 
human suffering that unites itself to Christ. (SD. V.24.) In this way it is analogous to the 
way the Church completes the redemptive work of Christ. In this way suffering united to 
Christ has a creative character. (SD. V.24.) This is because it is to suffer for the 
Kingdom of God. (SD. V.21.) Christ revealed the Kingdom of God through suffering 
and it is through sharing in Christ’s suffering that those who suffer can enter this
38 Gerard Rossé, The Cry o f Jesus on the Cross. A biblical and Theological Study (NY : Paulist Press, 
1987), 115.
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Kingdom. (SD. V.21.) It makes sense that if they share in his suffering they should also 
share in his glory. (SD. V.22.)
Suffering, as all ready mentioned can be creative. It can lead to spiritual maturity and is 
an opportunity for virtue. (SD. V.23.) If the individual shows bravery and perseverance 
in the face of suffering, he unleashes hope in the world by encouraging others in their 
task of living. It also makes the individual hopeful because he has responded 
courageously when faced with adversity. This will help maintain in him ‘the conviction 
that suffering will not get the better of him, that it will not deprive him of his dignity as a 
human being, a dignity linked to awareness of the meaning of life.’ (SD. V.24.) God has 
chosen to act through suffering in this world. This paradox is at the heart of the Gospel, 
namely that God revealed his glory in weakness and saved the world through suffering. 
Therefore, those suffering should never feel useless even if judged so by modem 
standards because to suffer is to be particularly susceptible to being a channel of God’s 
salvific power. (SD. V.23.) Those in extreme situations of suffering may, at times, not 
feel very valuable but they are infinitely valuable to God and the world even if the world 
is blind to this truth. The Church recognises the special value of those who suffer and 
sees in suffering something good before which the Church bows down in reference with 
all the depth of her faith in the Redemption. (SD. V.24.)
‘Down through the centuries and generations it has been seen that in suffering there is 
concealed a particular power that draws a person interiorly close to Christ, a special 
grace.’ (SD. VI.26.) Many saints such as St. Francis of Assisi and St. Ignatius Loyola 
testify to this. (SD. VI.25.) When the body is gravely ill and movement becomes 
difficult and the person is severely confined, interior maturity and spiritual greatness are
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revealed which constitute a touching lesson to those who are healthy. (SD. VI.26.) 
However, suffering being an evil, cannot be changed by grace from the outside, only 
from within. This is why Christ took suffering and death upon himself. Christ through 
his own salvific suffering is present in every human suffering and can act from within 
that suffering through His consoling Spirit. (SD. VI.26.)
Mary, the mother of God, is the epitome of a human being’s contribution to the 
redemption of all. She knew that a sword would pierce her heart yet she accepted intense 
suffering with singular clarity. (SDVI .25.) She made a unique contribution to the 
Redemption. However, we are all called to suffer for Christ. Christ explicitly said ‘If 
any man would follow me ... let him take up his Cross daily.’ He warns his followers that 
they will be persecuted for following him but the Spirit will assist them and they will gain 
eternal life. (SD. V. 25.) Such persecution is a sign of union with Christ. He calls them 
to have courage and fortitude.
When the suffering person puts the question of suffering to God, God does not answer 
from an ivory tower but from the cross. Christ’s answer however is no quick-fix. It isn’t 
an abstract explanation but a call to discipleship, which takes time to be discerned 
interiorly. When the individual takes up his cross and unites his suffering to Christ, it is 
then that he finds inner peace. (SD. VI.26.) Moreover, he is carrying out an invaluable 
service for his fellow humans because his suffering opens the way for grace which 
transforms human souls. (SD. V.27.)
I l l
5.4.4 The Good Samaritan.
The parable o f  the Good Samaritan tells us that everyone is our neighbour. W e should 
not turn our back on anyone who is suffering. W e m ust stop and make ourselves 
available to care for them  and express solidarity w ith them in their suffering. For Christ 
said “As you did it to  the least one o f  these my brethren, you did it to  m e.” (SD. VII.30.)
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Pope John Paul II discerned that at the heart o f  the ‘culture o f  death’ lies the failure ‘ to 
perceive any meaning or value in suffering.’ 1. This thesis set out to examine 
contemporary attitudes towards death and suffering in the context o f  the euthanasia 
debate. The changes in attitudes towards death and suffering are inextricably linked, 
emerged under the same conditions and due to the pervading ideologies o f  modernity and 
postmodemity. The former’s reliance on instrumental reason, and the latter’s denial o f  
truth, had the combined effect stripping the mysteries o f  suffering and death o f  all 
meaning and reducing them to biological processes, which were then subjected to  human 
control and domination.
It is the Pope’s judgem ent that much in contemporary liberal society is a ‘veritable 
structure o f  sin .’2 This crisis does not involve a mere corruption o f  the will but involves 
also ‘the order o f  intelligence and thereby that which give institutions their inner logic or 
shape.’3 This point is brought out in chapter three o f  this thesis in relation to medicine. It 
underwent radical changes in its inner logic. It cut itse lf o f f  from its roots in Christian 
compassion and adopted a technological mentality. A s a result m edicine becam e a 
mechanistic-instrumentalist discipline instead o f  a ministry o f  mercy. Its primary focus 
was disease not patients. It became concerned with manipulating nature at the expense o f  
caring for persons.
CONCLUSION
1 Cf. David L. Schindler, ‘Christological aesthetics and Evangelium Vitae: Toward a definition o f  
liberalism ’ in Communio, 22(1995), 193. See also P ope John Paul 11, Encyclical L etter Evangelium Vitae 
(25 M arch 1995 )  n. 12. H ereafter E V  and cited in the body o f  the text.
2 Ibid.
3 Cf. ibid., 197.
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The mechanistic model o f  m edicine doesn’t even have a category for much o f  what 
constitutes human suffering. It reduced suffering to physical pain and ignored moral 
suffering or suffering o f  the soul. It cannot recognise this kind o f  suffering because it no 
longer treats patients as persons but as mere biological entities. In chapter four, we see 
how  the neglect o f  the human person as a unity o f  body and soul, coupled with an 
interpretation o f  ‘quality o f  life ’ which places more emphasis on having and doing than 
actually being, leads to euthanasia. M odem  m edicine has no basis for caring for patients 
when the prospect o f  cure has vanished.
Chapter five advocates the return o f  m edicine to its roots in Christian compassion. It 
challenges the notion o f  mercy which eliminates suffering by elim inating the one who 
suffers. It argues for the restoration o f  value to the sick and the dying based on the 
Christian concept o f  mercy. This chapter included a detailed treatment o f  the Christian 
meaning o f  human suffering. This was important because in the context o f  the euthanasia 
debate and the attitudes in society, which the euthanasia debate reflects, the sick and the 
dying are oftentimes made to feel a burden to society. The discovery o f  the salvific 
meaning o f  suffering in union with Christ overcom es this feeling o f  uselessness and 
worthlessness. The suffering person who shares in the suffering o f  Christ also shares in 
his redemptive work. In other words, they serve the salvation o f  their fellow  members o f  
society. In sharing in Christ’s redemptive work they w ill also share in his glory. 
(SD.V T27.) Through their suffering, like gold in the furnace, they are made worthy o f  
his kingdom.
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They are worthy in the eyes o f  God even i f  they feel worthless in the eyes o f  
contemporary society. To comfort the sick and the dying is to offer them this hope. It is 
not to confirm their fears that they are better o f f  dead and kill them.
M edicine has expressed itse lf in mechanistic-instrumentalist patterns o f  thought and 
action because o f  a separation o f  form (the meaning which gives shape to the culture’s 
institutions and patterns o f  life) and love in the understanding o f  nature and o f  the 
severance o f  nature from grace. 4 ‘Form abstracted form love becom es externalised, 
manipulative, and forceful.’5 The entire thesis points to this fact. Christ, the incarnate 
God, as the Logos revealed the ultimate unity o f  form and love in his very self.6 Nature 
will not be ordered by love unless it is reunited with grace. For only ‘the blood o f  Christ, 
while it reveals the grandeur o f  the Father’s love, [can show] how  precious man is to  
God’s eyes and how  priceless the value o f  his life .’7 (EV. n.22.)
In the introduction I argued for a communitarian bioethic because by the tim e w e start 
discussing dilemmas there is often stalemate because attitudes to suffering and death, 
often unexamined, are already formed and predetermine life and death decisions. I 
argued that w e must begin by examining cultural biases in order to  understand the debate 
and tackle the culture o f  death at its rood causes. I began by doing this and ended in
4 Cf. Schindler, ‘Christological aesthetics... 200. See also double-dualism  described by H ans U rs von 





chapter five with Christ. However, through out the course o f  this thesis I have learned 
that i f  we want to cultivate an unconditional choice for life in contemporary culture w e  
must begin and end with Christ. Christ should not be the mere motivation or the source 
o f  our answers. He is the answer. W e must engage the popular culture with the Gospel 
o f  Life. Som e people w ill argue that this takes moral theology into a ghetto. I don’t 
believe a specifically Christian m essage precludes dialogue with non-Christians. Pope 
John Paul II addresses Evangelium Vitae to all people o f  goodwill.
A  case for God’s place in society needs to be made because the source o f  our cultural 
crisis is living ‘as though God did not exist.’ (EV. n .22.) It emanates from ‘the loss o f  
contact with G od’s w ise design.’ (EV. n.22.)8 It com es from a loss o f  ‘the proper sense 
o f  creaturehood -  o f  what it means to be one whose very being is a being-from .’9 In not 
knowing God w e do not know ourselves. W e fail to realise that man is not first creative 
but first receptive-and obedient. A  true culture o f  life:
... arises from faith in the God o f  life, who has created every individual as 
a “wonder”(cf. Ps 139:14). It is the outlook o f  those who see life  in its 
deeper meaning, who grasp its utter gratuitousness, its beauty and its 
invitation to freedom and responsibility. It is the outlook o f  those who do 
not presume to take possession o f  reality, but instead accept it as a gift, 
discovering in all things the reflection o f  the Creator and seeing in 
everyperson his living im age (cf. Gen 1:27; Ps 8:5) (EV. n .83 .)10
Only then w ill w e open to the mysteries o f  suffering and death and learn to revere all 
human beings equally.
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